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CHAPTER 11 
Insurance Law 
EDWARD N. WADSWORTH and JOHN G. RYAN 
A. CouRT DECISIONS 
§11.1. Motor vehicle insurance rate cases: Attacks on constitutional 
and procedural grounds. The 1971 SuRVEY year .. once again found the 
commissioner of insurance called upon to defend insurance premium 
rates and classifications established either directly by the Massachusetts 
legislature or pursuant to statutory authority by the commissioner 
himself. The principal cases were Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. 
Commissioner of Insurance, 1 Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Commis-
sioner of Insurance,2 and Insurance Rating Board v. Commissioner 
of Insurance. 3 These three cases will be discussed together, even though 
two of them concerned 1970 rates, because of similarities in the subject 
matter and in the reasoning employed by the Supreme Judicial Court. 
These cases illustrate the distinction, not always clearly appreciated, 
between judicial disapproval of rates because they are so low as to be 
confiscatory and unconstitutional, and disapproval on the ground that 
the rates have not been established in accordance with appropriate 
procedural or statutory standards. 
In Aetna, the plaintiff (70 insurance companies and a rating organi-
zation) challenged a provision of the Acts of 1971 that required prop-
erty damage liability rates for 1971 to be set at least 15 percent lower 
than comparable 1970 rates.4 The plaintiff charged that the rates were 
confiscatory and unconstitutional despite the statutory declaration that 
the 15 percent reduction produced rates which were "adequate, just, 
reasonable and nondiscriminatory."5 The Supreme Judicial Court 
correctly refused to accord any weight to this language, indicating 
that the legislature cannot constitutionally exempt its activities from 
judicial review. 
Because the commissioner of insurance had admitted all facts con-
tained in the pleadings, the Aetna Court was confronted with a record 
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§11.1. 1 1970Mass.Adv.Sh.I411,263N.E.2d698. 
21970Mass.Adv.Sh.I537,265N.E.2d90. 
3 1971 Mass.Adv. Sh. 401,268 N.E.2d 144. 
4 Acts of 1970, c. 670, §6, amendingG.L., c. 175, §113B. 
5 Ibid. 
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that indicated a substantial aggregate property damage underwriting 
loss in 1969 for all companies writing such insurance in Massachu-
setts. Projecting from 1969 industry experience and using 1969 rates 
reduced by 15 percent (1970 rates were not yet established), an aggre-
gate underwriting loss of over $34 million was projected for 1971 with 
regard to the Massachusetts property damage business of all the com-
panies. Moreover, based on these assumptions, each individual com-
pany writing such insurance in Massachusetts in 1971 would experi-
ence an underwriting loss on such insurance. The Court rejected the 
commissioner's contention that insufficient detail had been shown as 
to the effect of the rates on each individual insurer. In addition, 
although not expressly adopting the principle, the Court did cite 
authority for the proposition that the "aggregate experience of a group 
of insurers may be deserving of greater weight than that of an individual 
company."6 
The commissioner also argued that the bill was demurrable because 
it sought a review of constitutional adequacy as to automobile liability 
insurance only, and not as to the "overall automobile insurance 
situation." The Court had no difficulty rejecting this contention, 
finding a clear legislative intent "that each type of automobile liability 
insurance coverage be considered and treated separately from all others 
for rate purposes. "7 
The most fundamental contention made by the commissioner in the 
Aetna case was that the Commonwealth, as part of its plenary power 
to regulate insurance, had the power to prescribe rates irrespective of 
the effect of such rates on insurers, and that the only option available 
to insurers who could not write insurance on a profitable basis was 
simply to cease writing such insurance. The Court indicated that the 
Commonwealth's regulatory power over insurance does not extend so 
far: "The writing of insurance is a lawful business and the Common-
wealth may not impose unconstitutional conditions upon the exercise 
of the right to engage therein."8 The opinion further declared that 
although rates need not be such as to guarantee a profit to all insurers, 
the commissioner may not constitutionally set rates which apparently 
would result in a loss to all. Insurers "have a right to rates which are 
not confiscatory, or which satisfy any higher applicable statutory 
standards."9 The Court thereupon ruled that the automobile property 
damage liability insurance rates set by the legislature for 1971 were 
confiscatory and unconstitutional. 
The Supreme Judicial Court chose, as precedent, cases relating for 
the most part to limitations on the ability of the legislature, acting 
pursuant to the so-called police power, to restrict otherwise lawful 
activities.10 Somewhat surprisingly, no direct reference was made to 
6 1970Mass.Adv. Sh.l417,263N.E.2d 702. 
7 Id. at 1418,263 N.E.2dat 703. 
8 Id. at 1418,263 N.E.2dat 703. 
9 Id. at 1419,263 N.E.2dat 703. 
10 E.g., see Opinion of the Justices, 322 Mass. 755, 79 N.E.2d 883 (1948) (cemetery 
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rate cases ansmg in other contexts, especially in respect to public 
utility rates,u nor did the Court cite the language in the opinion 
that first established the constitutionality of compulsory motor vehicle 
insurance in Massachusetts: 
A fundamental principle of rate making by public authority is 
that in general the rate so established must be sufficient to yield 
a fair return on the reasonable value of the property used or in-
vested for doing the business after paying costs and carrying 
charges. Rates not sufficient to yield such return are unjust, un-
reasonable and confiscatory. 12 
In the Travelers case, the Supreme Judicial Court, in a brief opinion 
relying principally on Aetna, held unconstitutional a provision of the 
Acts of 1968 that had directed the commissioner of insurance to es-
tablish for 1970 the same compulsory liability classifications as were 
in effect in 1967 and rates no higher than the 1967 rates. 13 When the 
plaintiffs (46 insurance companies and a rating organization) filed a 
request with the commissioner for a hearing on compulsory liability 
rates, he declined on the ground that no hearing was necessary in the 
face of the legislature's mandate. 
Using 1967 rates and projecting underwriting experience from that 
of 1968 (the most recent year for which statistics were available), the 
master to whom the case was referred estimated that the plaintiffs would 
sustain an aggregate loss in 1970 of more than $13 million on compul-
sory insurance. Moreover, only one of the insurers would have had 
an operating profit. The Court held that based upori these findings 
the 1967 rates were confiscatory and unlawful for use in 1970, and 
were not "adequate, just, reasonable and nondiscriminatory" as re-
quired by G.L., c. 175, §113B. The commissioner was thereupon 
ordered to establish the 1970 rates and risk classifications in accordance 
with those statutory standards. 14 
Adherence to the statutory standards of G.L., c. 175, §ll3B was it-
self the issue in the Rating Board case. The Commissioner claimed to 
have discharged his statutory duty to establish "adequate, just, reason-
able and nondiscriminatory premium charges" when, after a public 
hearing, he disapproved the property damage and medical payments 
insurance rates proposed for 1970 by two insurance rating organiza-
tions. His disapproval, expressed in a brief written opinion, left the 
1969 rates in effect. The rating organizations did not contend that the 
associations may not be precluded from selling grave monuments); Wyeth v. Cambridge 
Bd. of Health, 200 Mass. 474, 86 N.E. 925 (1909) (undertakers may not be required to be 
embalmers). . 
11 See especially New England Tel. and Tel. Co. v. Department of Pub. Utils., 331 
Mass.604, 121 N.E.2d 896 (1954). 
12 Opinionofthejustices, 251 Mass. 569,610, 147 N.E. 681,700 (1925). 
"Acts of 1968, c. 643, §2A, amendingG.L., c.175, §113B. 
14 Once established, these rates and classifications were to be retroactive to January 
1, 1970. 
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rates thus continued were confiscatory and unconstitutional, but 
rather that the commissioner had failed to comply with prescribed 
procedures in setting the rates. The Supreme Judicial Court agreed 
with the plaintiffs and indicated that the commissioner had not dis-
charged his statutory duty by simply disapproving the proposed rates. 
The Court accepted the principle that "[r]ates are not adequate, fair 
and reasonable if a large aggregate loss for the preceding year and a 
probable greater loss for the year in issue are ignored and the preced-
ing year's rates simply renewed."15 Without further evidence, how-
ever, the Court was unwilling to find that renewal of the 1969 rates 
in fact violated the aforementioned principle, for the record did not 
include admissions by the commissioner, as there were in Aetna, that 
extensive underwriting losses had been incurred in the preceding 
year. What the Court did hold in the Rating Board case was that the 
commissioner's findings were insufficient to enable the justices "to 
determine (a) whether his order and conclusions are warranted by 
appropriate subsidiary findings, and (b) whether such subsidiary 
findings are supported by substantial evidence." 16 The case was 
remanded to the commissioner so that he could develop a record that 
would list his subsidiary findings and conclusions and indicate "the 
manner in which the various elements which he considers and incorpor-
ates in his determination are combined so as to arrive atthe rates .... " 17 
The Court's decision seems to have been compelled by precedent18 
and, moreover, is necessary if the courts are to maintain an effective 
review of the rate-setting process. . 
Another aspect of the decision should be noted. Information regard-
ing the investment income of the insurers had been requested and 
received by the commissioner for use in establishing compulsory 
liability rates. He had also generally adopted the insurers' formula 
for determining the appropriate amount of the earnings to be appor-
tioned to the relevant lines of insurance. However, the Court indicated 
that the commissioner had erred to the extent that he had included in 
the apportionment formula income from premiums and reserves re-
lated to lines of insurance other than compulsory liability. This 
inclusion was deemed contrary to the holding in Aetna that each type 
of coverage must be treated separately from all others for rate-setting 
purposes. 
§11.2. Motor vehicle liability insurance: Scope of definition of the 
insured. In Drescher v. Travelers Insurance Co., 1 the principal 
insured had purchased an automobile to be used by his son, who was 
a student at the University of Massachusetts. The plaintiff, a close 
15 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 401,404, 268N.E.2d 144, 147. 
16 I d. at 407, 268 N .E.2d at 149. 
17 Ibid. 
18 See Massachusetts Bonding and Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Ins., 329 Mass. 265, 
273, 107 N.E.2d 807, 812 (1952), citing Insurance Co. of North Amt!rica v. Commissioner 
of Ins., 327 Mass. 745, 753, 101 N.E.2d 335, 340 (1951). 
§11.2. 1 1971 Mass.Adv.Sh. 799,269N.E.2d651. 
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friend of the principal insured's son, was driving the car at the time of 
an accident which resulted in the deaths of the principal insured's 
son and a second passenger. An action on behalf of the estate of the 
second passenger had resulted in a settlement payment by the driver 
of over $25,000. The issue before the Supreme Judicial Court in 
Drescher was whether the plaintiff driver was an "insured" within 
the meaning of the principal insured's motor vehicle liability insur-
ance policy, for if this was established, the insurer would be liable 
for the $25,000 settlement payment. The relevant policy provision, 
commonly called an omnibus clause, defined the insured as the "named 
insured" (the father) and anyone using the car with the permission 
of the named insured, "provided his actual operation or (if he is not 
operating) his other actual use thereof is within the scope of such 
permission. " 2 
The more modern cases typically hold that use of an automobile 
by a person other than the permittee (the son in this case) is impliedly 
authorized by the principal insured if he has given "broad and un-
fettered dominion" over the automobile to the permittee.3 On the 
other hand, where the principal insured has instructed the permittee 
not to allow others to drive the automobile, a second permittee (the 
driver in this case) is not likely to be considered an insured under an 
omnibus clause.4 Courts have often, however, found an implied 
authorization in spite of seemingly clear instructions by the principal 
insured.5 Omnibus clauses in automobile policies are construed 
liberally and courts therefore assume, unless a contrary intent is 
manifested, that a general dominion was granted to the permittee.6 
In Drescher, the Supreme Judicial Court found that the father had 
given"his son general dominion over the car, having placed no restric-
tions on its use. "Since the [father] ... appears to have delegated 
such broad responsibility to his son, it is reasonable to assume that 
the driving of the car by the plaintiff while the son was riding in it 
and for his purposes was impliedly sanctioned by the father." 7 Ac-
cordingly, the Court held that the plaintiff was an "insured" within 
the meaning of the policy.8 The implied permission of the father was 
2 Id. at 800, 269 N .E.2d at 653. 
3 National Farmers U.P. and Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 277 F. Supp. 542 
(D. Mont. 1967). The Supreme Judicial Court adopted the liberal rule and cited de-
cisions from six other jurisdictions in support of its position. For a discussion of the 
issue of implied permission, see 7 Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice §4361 (1962, 
Supp. 1972). 
4 Baeslerv. Globe Indem. Co., 33 N.J. 148, 162A.2d854 (1960). 
s National Farmers U.P. and Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 227 F. Supp. 542 
(D. Mont. 1967). 
6 Travelers Corp. v. Kaminski, 304 F. Supp. 481 (D. Md. 1969); Farm Bureau Ins. Co. 
v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 180 Neb. 555, 143 N.W.2d 923 (1966). See 7 Appleman, Insur-
ance Law and Practice §4361 (1962, Supp. 1972). 
7 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 799,802,269 N.E.2d651, 653-654. 
8 Cases relied on by the trial judge in reaching a contrary result were easily dis-
tinguished by the Court inasmuch as they all involved the use of automobiles outside 
the specific and limited purposes for which they were loaned. 
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based on the fact that the plaintiff had been driving the car "while the 
son [the permittee] was riding in it and for his [the son's] purposes." 
However, in three of the cases cited by the Court in support of its 
holding, the permittee was not in the car when the accident occurred, 
and the use of the car was "for his purposes" only to the extent that 
the permittee had loaned the vehicle as a friendly gesture. 9 Drescher, 
therefore, would appear to provide support for the proposition that 
it should make no difference in a particular case whether the permittee 
was in the vehicle at the time of the accident, or whether he was re-
ceiving some particular benefit from the use of the vehicle by someone 
else. 
§11.3. Motor vehicle liability insurance: Breach of cooperation and 
assistance clause. Foshee v. Insurance Co. of North Amerzca 1 involved 
a determination of whether the insured had breached the cooperation 
and assistance clause in his motor vehicle liability policy and thus 
excused the insurer from liability. The plaintiff, who had been a guest 
injured while riding in the insured's car, had originally brought an 
action for injuries against the insured in the Boston Municipal Court. 
Although the insurer had directed several communications to the in-
sured at his last known address, the insured failed to appear at trial. 
The insurer's counsel thereupon withdrew his appearance, and a de-
fault was entered. The insurer participated no further in the action 
and notified the insured at his last known address that the insurer had 
disclaimed all liability under the policy. Although the default was 
thereafter removed by the insured, a final default in the action was later 
entered in the superior court. The plaintiff, having secured a default 
judgment against the insured, then brought a bill in equity to reach 
and apply the noncompulsory coverage of the insured's motor vehicle 
liability policy. The trial judge dismissed this bill. 
The Supreme Judicial Court experienced little difficulty upholding 
the dismissal. First, the Court cited the general rule that in an action 
such as that in Foshee, any defense available to the insurer against the 
insured is also available to the insurer against the plaintiff. 2 The 
Court also treated as "well settled" the proposition that an insurer's 
liability terminates if the insured commits a material breach of the 
9 In one case, the permittee was living away from home with another family. He loaned 
the car to a member of that family for use in grocery shopping. Kresbsbach v. Miller, 22 
Wis. 2d 171, 125 N.W.2d 408 (1963). In a second case cited by the Court, the permittee 
was away at college. After he had returned from a picnic, accompanied by a friend and 
the friend's date, it was discovered that the girl had forgotten an item at the picnic area. 
The car was loaned to the permittee's friend so that he could return to the picnic area 
with his date. Peterson v. Armstrong, 176 So. 2d 453 (La. 1965). In a third case cited in 
Drescher, the permittee had use of a company car. He allowed his son to use the car to 
drive to a restaurant, but the accident occurred while the son was driving several college 
students back to their campus. Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rollason, 246 F.2d 105 (4th Cir. 
1957). See also Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 72 N .] . Super. 402, 178 
A.2d 358 (1962). 
§11.3. 1 1971 Mass.Adv.Sh.813,269N.E.2d677. 
2 Imperiali v. Pica, 338 Mass. 494, 156 N.E.2d 44 (1959). 
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cooperation clause. Finally, it accepted the finding of the trial judge 
that the insurer had exercised due diligence and good faith in attempt-
ing to locate its insured.3 Nonetheless, before a disclaimer of liability 
may be enforceable, it must be demonstrated that the breach of the 
cooperation clause was material. On the question of materiality, the 
Court cited some Massachusetts decisions which indicated that great 
difficulty on the part of the insurer's counsel in locating and communi-
catingwith the insured amounts to a material breach of the cooperation 
clause, justifying a disclaimer of liability when the insured thereafter 
fails to appear at trial.4 
It should also be remembered that a Massachusetts insured does not 
meet the required norm for cooperation simply by keeping his insurer 
notified as to his current address. The insured in lmperiali v. Pica5 had 
cooperated in every respect except in his failure to assist counsel for 
the insurer in preparing necessary answers to meet the other party's 
demand to admit facts. In upholding the enforceability of the insurer's 
disclaimer, the Supreme Judicial Court stated that "[a]n insured can-
not excuse his failure to furnish 10 percent of the cooperation requested 
of him by showing that he had cooperated as to 90 per cent."6 
§11.4. Motor vehicle liability insurance: Limitation of liability. 
Johnson v. Travelers Indemnity Co. 1 concerned an attempt by an 
insurer to limit its liability arising out of a loss covered by more than 
one policy of insurance. The insureds owned three automobiles, each 
covered by a separate liability insurance policy that included protec-
tion against uninsured motorists. Liability on that protection was 
limited in each of the policies to $5000 per person. The insureds' 
young son was covered by each of the policies at the time he was struck 
and killed by an automobile driven by an uninsured motorist. The 
superior court issued a decree which provided that if liability were 
determined and damages assessed, recovery might be had on each policy 
up to one-third of the damages, with an upper limit of $5000 per 
policy; that is, there might be a potential maximum recovery of $15,000 
if actual damages so warranted. 
On appeal to the Supreme Judicial Court, the insurer asserted that 
its total liability should be governed by a provision, appearing in 
each policy, which specified that when a loss is covered by more than 
one policy, 
the damages shall be deemed not to exceed the higher of the 
3 For a decision holding that the insurer had failed in its duty to communicate with 
the insured, see Cormier v. Crosta, 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 416, 268 N.E.2d 131 (rescript 
opinon). See also Tomlinson v. Goldberg, 121 Pa. Super. 125, 182 A. 765 ( 1936); Tuder 
v. Commonwealth Cas. Co., 10 N.J. Misc. 1206, 163 A. 27 (1932). 
4 Peters v. Saulinier, 351 Mass. 609, 222 N.E.2d 871 (1967); Polito v. Galluzzo, 337 
Mass. 360, 149 N.E.2d 375 (1958). For a similar holding in another jurisdiction, see Pat-
ton v. Washington Ins. Exch., 288 Ill. App. 594, 6 N.E.2d 472 (1937). 
5 338Mass. 494, 156N.E.2d44 (1959). 
6 ld.at500, 156N.E.2dat48. 
§11.4. 1 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 869,269 N.E.2d 700. 
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applicable limits of liability of this insurance and such other 
insurance, and the company shall not be liable for a greater pro-
portion of any loss to which this coverage applies than the limit 
of liability hereunder bears to the sum of the applicable limits 
of this insurance and such other insurance. 2 
This provision, urged the insurer, should limit its total liability to 
$5000, one-third being payable under each policy. The Court agreed 
that the clause, if valid, would indeed limit liability on each policy 
to one-third of $5000. However, the Court interpreted the statutory 
language applicable at the time3 to require that each policy provide 
uninsured motorists coverage of no less than $5000. Accordingly, it 
was held that the "other insurance" clause in the policy was ineffec-
tive to the extent of its conflict with the statutory language, ~nd the 
decree of the superior court was affirmed. 
It should be noted that the section of the General Laws interpreted 
by the Supreme Judicial Court in johnson was repealed the year after 
the insureds' son was killed.4 However, the present statutory scheme-
would dictate the same result as that reached by the Court in] ohnson. 5 
§11.5. Disability insurance: Definition of total disability. Town 
of Norwell v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. 1 involved the 
meaning to be given to the term total disability appearing in a group 
disability insurance policy issued by defendant to the town of Nor-
well, covering certain of its employees. Particularly in issue were the 
weekly payments which would be made under the policy for up to 
two years to persons who were totally disabled as the result of acci-
dental bodily injury. The employee involved, a police officer, returned 
to work at his own request approximately eleven weeks after his initial 
accident. He left again, however, after about ten days, having found 
himself unable to carry out his normal duties. As of December 1970 
he still had not returned to work as a police officer. 
Total disability was defined in the policy as the "complete in-
ability of an Insured Person to perform each and every duty of his 
regular occupation until Weekly Indemnity has been payable for one 
2 Id. at 870, 269 N.E.2d at 701. 
3 At the time of the death of the insured's son, G.L., c. 90, §34L provided that no 
motor vehicle liability policy could be issued without uninsured motorists coverage, 
in an amount "no less than" that set for compulsory liability insurance under G.L., c. 
90, §34A (which required coverage of "at least five thousand dollars on account of in-
jury to or death of any one person, and subject to such limits as respects injury to or 
death of one person, of at least ten thousand dollars on account of any one accident 
resulting in injury to or death of more than one person .... "). 
4 G.L., c. 90, §34L, repealed by Acts of 1968, c. 643, §6. 
5 Acts of 1968, c. 643, §5 added Section 113L to G.L., c. 175. Section 113L provides 
that no policy shall be issued with respect to a motor vehicle, trailer or semitrailer regis-
tered in the Commonwealth unless the policy provides for uninsured motorists coverage 
"in amounts or limits prescribed for bodily injury or death for a liability policy under 
this chapter. ... "Liability for bodily injury or death is governed by G.L., c. 175, §112, 
which incorporates the limits set by G.L., c. 90, §34A. See n.3 supra. 
§11.5. 1 1971 Mass.Adv.Sh.35,265N.E.2d915. 
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hundred and four weeks during any time of continuous disability."2 
The town of Norwell argued that the claimant was totally disabled if 
he was unable to perform even one of his regular duties as a police 
officer. Completely opposite was the insurer's argument that if the 
claimant could perform even one of his regular duties, he was not 
totally disabled under the policy. The insurer maintained that its 
obligation terminated when the claimant returned to work because, 
even for the fairly brief time involved, the claimant had performed 
some of the duties of a police officer. After examining the very ambig-
uous policy language, the master to whom the case had been referred 
agreed with the town of Norwell. The Plymouth Superior Court 
entered a final decree affirming the master's finding that the officer 
was in fact unable to perform "each and every duty of his regular 
occupation." · 
On appeal by the insurer, the Supreme Judicial Court determined 
that total disability in fact existed, but the decision does not seem to 
have been based on the time-honored principle that ambiguity in 
policy language is to be construed against the insurer. Instead, per-
haps feeling that neither party's interpretation was consistent with 
the purposes of disability insurance, the Court said: 
Complete physical or mental incapacity of the insured ... is 
not essential to his total disability .... It is sufficient that his 
disability is such that it prevents him from performing remuner-
ative work of a substantial and not merely trifling character.3 
The Court viewed the claimant's unsuccessful attempt to return to 
work at his "regular profession" as tending to confirm rather than 
negate the existence of total disability.4 
§11.6. Disability insurance: Statements in the policy application. 
Each of the insured's statements in a policy application is generally 
characterized as either a representation or a warranty. G.L., c. 175, 
§186 enables the insurer to avoid the policy upon a showing of any 
misrepresentation made by the in&ured that increases the risk of loss 
or is made with actual intent to deceive.' However, if statements in 
2 Id. at37, 265 N.E.2d at916. 
3 Id. at 37, 265 N.E.2d at 917, citing Zakon v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 328 Mass. 
486, 489-490, 104 N.E.2d 603, 605 (1952). 
4 The Town of Norwell decision is consonant with the prevailing rule of law as ex-
pressed in North American Accident Ins. Co. v. Miller: "It has been held that, where the 
policy limits the right to indemnity to a continuous period of (total] disability, the con-
tinuity is not broken by the fact that the insured returned to his work at long intervals 
and worked for only short periods while still suffering from the injury." 193 S.W. 750, 
756 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917). For more recent cases expressing the same viewpoint, see 
Joyce v. United Ins. Co., 202 Cal. App. 2d 654,21 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1962); Sullivan v. North 
American Accident Ins. Co., 150 A.2d 467 (D.C. Mun. App. 1959); Erreca v. Western 
States Life Ins. Co., 19 Cal. 2d 388, 121 P.2d 689 (1942); Wood v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 
224 Iowa 179,277 N.W. 241 (1938). See also lA Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice 
§651 (1965, Supp. 1972). 
§11.6. 1 G.L., c. 175, §186 provides: "No oral or written misrepresentation or war-
9
Wadsworth and Ryan: Chapter 11: Insurance Law
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1971
234 1971 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §11.6 
the insured's application are expressly made conditions precedent to 
the effectiveness of the policy, and if there is a material misstatement, 
coverage under the policy may be denied without reference to Section 
186.2 
In Shaw v. Commercial Insurance Co., 3 two accident, health, and 
disability policies had been issued to the plaintiff, a surgeon, "in 
consideration of the statements [of the insured] in the application" 
for the policy. Another provision in each policy indicated that, after 
two years, only fraudulent misstatements in the application might be 
used to avoid the policy. The trial judge found that the policy pro-
visions served to make the accuracy of all material statements in the 
applications conditions precedent to the effectiveness of the policies. 
He found, moreover, that the plaintiff had made false statements re-
garding his own mental health, although the statements were "not 
made fraudulently and with knowledge of their falsity."4 The Su-
preme Judicial Court reversed, holding simply that nothing in the 
policy made the truth of statements in the application a condition 
precedent. The case was remanded for a factual determination as to 
whether the policy could be avoided under the criteria set forth in 
Section 186. The Supreme Judicial Court's decision is consistent with 
the test set out in Charles, Henry and Crowley Co. v. Home Insurance 
Co., which held that a statement in an application may be a condition 
precedent rather than a representation or warranty only if 
(l) the statement made by the insured relates essentially to the 
insurer's intelligent decision to issue the policy; and (2) the state-
ment is made a condition precedent to recovery under the policy, 
either by using the precise words "condition precedent" or their 
equivalent.5 
There are other interesting aspects to the case. In the application for 
one of the policies, Dr. Shaw answered that he had not received 
"medical attention or advice" for the preceding five years, when in 
fact shortly before completing the application he had consulted a 
medical doctor for psychotherapy with regard to marital difficulties. 
The Court indicated that any ambiguity in the question as to whether 
ranty made in the negotiation of a policy of insurance by the insured or in his behalf 
shall be deemed material or shall defeat or avoid the policy or prevent its attaching un-
less such misrepresentation or warranty is made with actual intent to deceive, or unless the 
matter misrepresented or made a warranty increased the risk of loss." For a decision 
holding that the insurer was entitled to avoid the policy because of the insured's mis-
representations, see Pahigian v. Manufacturers' Life Ins. Co., 349 Mass. 78, 206 N.E.2d 
660 (1965). 
2 "[G.L., c. 175, §186] does not apply to provisions in a policy which, by agreement 
of the parties, are made conditions precedent to the duty of performance on the part of 
the insurance company." Lopardi v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 289 Mass. 492, 
495, 194 N.E. 706, 707 (1935). . 
3 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 961,270 N.E.2d817. 
4 Id. at 964, 270 N .E.2d at 820. 
5 349 Mass. 723,726,212 N.E.2d240, 242 (1965). 
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psychotherapy constituted "medical attention or advice" was to be 
construed against the insurer. The clear lesson for insurers is to broaden 
the scope of their questioning. 
Both policies contained a provision that made recovery for dis-
ability dependent on the insured's being "regularly attended" by a 
qualified physician during the period of disability. The plaintiff 
attempted to show that a symptom of his illness was his inability to 
recognize that he was mentally ill, i.e., to recognize that he was dis-
abled and should be regularly attended. This condition, he claimed, 
should excuse him from the policy requirement and his past failure 
to comply with it. The Court apparently found no evidence that the 
insured was not fully capable of appreciating the policy requirement. 
As to Dr. Shaw's ability to assess his own situation, the Court noted 
the evidence of his awareness that others thought him to be ill. 
§11.7. Life insurance: Misrepresentations in policy application. 
]ames H. Boyle and Sons v. Prudential Insurance Co. 1 involved the 
principle that a life insurance policy may not be avoided by the insurer 
because of misrepresentations in the policy application if the insurer's 
examining physician incorrectly records information truthfully given 
by the applicant. 2 This prinCiple becomes very important when, as 
in the present case, the policy surely would never have been issued if 
the examining physician had properly recorded the information given 
by the applicant. 
The plaintiff corporation was the beneficiary under a life insurance 
policy issued by the defendant on the life of the corporation's presi-
dent, John F. Boyle. Evidence was presented by another company 
officer that he and Boyle had gone together to undergo a physical ex-
amination in connection with their respective applications for life 
insurance from Prudential. The doctor who examined them acted in 
behalf of the insurer and recorded information where required on the 
policy applications. After Boyle's death during the contestable period, 
Prudential tendered to the beneficiary the premiums paid on the de-
ceased's policy, plus interest, but refused to pay the face value of the 
policy on the ground that material misrepresentations had been made 
by Boyle in his policy application. At trial, Prudential offered evidence 
that at the time of his application, Boyle knew that he had several 
maladies, including a blood disorder, none of which was acknow-
ledged on his signed application for life insurance. The company 
officer who had accompanied Boyle testified that they had been ex-
amined together by the doctor. He also testified that when Boyle ex-
plained "his whole blood situation" to the doctor, the latter replied, 
"I wish you hadn't said it. I didn't hear it. ... There is nothing 
§11.7. 1 1971 Mass.Adv.Sh.505,268N.E.2d651. 
2 G.L., c. 175, §186 allows the insurer to avoid the policy if the misrepresentation was 
made "with actual intent to deceive" or if the misrepresentation "increased the risk of 
loss." For a general discussion, see Kappes, Misrepresentation as It Relates to Policies 
of Ordinary Life Insurance, in ABA Section of Insurance, Negligence and Compensa-
tion Law, Proceedings 65-90 (1965). 
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wrong with your blood that's serious." The credibility of the company 
officer was pivotal because the examining physician had died before 
trial. 
As to the insured, the most favorable inference that the jury could 
draw was that he had disclosed the truth to the physician, who had 
nonetheless filled out the application otherwise. The trial judge, how-
ever, refused to charge the jury as requested by the plaintiff's counsel, 
and the charge contained no reference to the possibility that the de-
fendant's examining physician had incorrectly recorded Boyle's truth-
ful statements as to his health. The jury found for the defendant. Al-
though the Supreme Judicial Court agreed that the evidence of any 
misrecording was "not impressive," the Court ruled that the trial judge 
should have charged the jury as to the inference that could be drawn if 
the testimony of the company officer were believed. The trial judge's 
failure to do so was considered reversible error. 
The rationale for the Supreme Judicial Court's decision is developed 
in considerably greater detail in Sullivan v. john Hancock Mutual 
Life Insurance Co., where the Court said: 
Under the majority doctrine ... it was a question of fact for 
the jury whether truthful answers were given by the insured and 
improperly recorded by an agent of the defendant. ... It would 
be unfair to permit an insurance company to avoid a contract of 
insurance because of the failure of a company's own insurance 
agent or examining physician correctly to record the answers 
given by an applicant.3 
§ll.8. Life insurance: Waiver of premiums. In King v. Prudential 
Insurance Co., 1 the insured became totally disabled during the grace 
period of a life insurance policy and died approximately one month 
after the grace period had expired. The issue in the case was whether 
the waiver of premium benefit had become effective and had preserved 
the policy from lapse. It was the insurer's contention that the waiver of 
premium provision required that notice of total disability be given 
during the lifetime of the insured, which had not been done. The 
Supreme Judicial Court rejected this contention, noting an ambiguity 
in the policy's notice provision that it felt could reasonably lead the 
average person to conclude that no notice of any kind was required 
until there had been six months' continuous disability. 
The Court, however, went further and adopted the general rule 
that, in the absence of unequivocal language to the contrary, the waiver 
of premium provision is activated at "the commencement of the dis-
ability itself, and not the time when proof of that disability [is] sub-
mitted .... " 2 In enunciating this rule, the Court expressly indicated 
its disapproval of language contained in a 1937 Massachusetts decision 
3 342 Mass. 649,654, 174 N.E.2d 771,774 (1961). 
§11.8. 1 1971 Mass.Adv.Sh.335,267N.E.2d643. 
2 Id. at 340, 267 N.E.2d at 647. 
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which indicated that there could be no waiver of premiums that be-
came due prior to the date when actual proof of disability was received 
by the insurer.3 In King, the Court adopted a rule that has been ac-
cepted by a majority of the courts that have considered the issue of total 
disability occurring during the grace period. A leading case, with 
reasoning the Supreme Judicial Court found persuasive, is Minnesota 
Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Marshall, in which the Eighth Circuit 
Court of Appeals stated: 
The right of the insured to have his premiums discontinued dur-
ing disability is 'one that he had paid for. To make its operation 
depend upon the time of proof of disability, and not the time of 
disability itself, which was the real thing that he was protecting 
himself against, renders the provision of the policy under con-
struction inoperative and the right of no value.4 
Old Colony Trust Co. v. Brockton Savings Bank,5 another case 
decided during the 1971 SuRVEY year, involved a fact situation similar 
to that in King. The insured became totally disabled during the 30-day 
grace period on several term savings bank life insurance policies and 
died approximately a week after the grace period had expired. The 
banks argued that premiums were not waived until "permanent dis-
ability" had been established, which required a six-month period of 
disability, and that, accordingly, the policies had lapsed. The Court 
passed over this issue and allowed recovery on the policies under the 
terms of riders, peculiar in the context of term insurance, which indi-
cated that if total disability commenced during the grace period, the 
unpaid premium would become a debt on the policy to be paid out of 
policy proceeds. 
§11.9. Business interruption loss insurance: Mitigation of loss. 
Gordon Chemical Co. v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. 1 concerned 
a substantial claim under a business interruption loss insurance policy 
issued by the defendant. Gordon Chemical Co. (Gordon) purchased 
monomer plastic that it converted to polystyrene and sold to Hammond 
Plastics, Inc. (Hammond). Hammond, in turn, processed the poly-
styrene into plastic molding pellets that it sold to various purchasers. 
Gordon was severely damaged by fire and explosion in 1963 and was 
unable to manufacture its product for approximately fifteen months. 
The business interruption loss policy covered, for the period which was 
reasonably required for resumption of business, the actual loss of net 
profits and certain necessarily continuing charges and expenses. Gor-
don's loss within the policy was over $211,000. 
During the period of interruption, Hammond purchased polystyrene 
3 Sherman v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 297 Mass. 330, 335, 8 N.E.2d 892, 894 (1937). 
4 29 F.2d 977,978 (8th Cir. 1928). See also the numerous cases cited in King, 1971 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. 335, 340, 267 N.E.2d 643, 647; and 15 Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice 
§8309 (1944, Supp. 1972). 
5 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh.l238, 271 N.E.2d619. 
§11.9. 1 1971 Mass.Adv.Sh.l01,266N.E.2d653. 
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from other sources and operated more profitably than before. Some-
what surprisingly as a matter of economic fact, it was conceded that if 
Gordon had purchased polystyrene and sold it to Hammond, it would 
have suffered no loss within defendant's policy. The defendant con-
tended that Gordon was obligated to purchase polystyrene and sell it 
to Hammond, but the defendant apparently did not raise the question 
of a general duty to mitigate damages. Its principal argument was based 
on three "resumption of operations" conditions contained in the 
policy. The policy provisions required the insured, if possible, to 
mitigate its damages (l) by a complete or partial resumption of opera-
tion of the damaged property, (2) by making use of other available 
property (defined narrowly), or (3) by making use of available stock 
(raw, in process, or finished). The Supreme Judicial Court. held that 
none of these three conditions required Gordon to purchase poly-
styrene manufactured by competitors and sell it to Hammond. 
Another argument of the defendant was that Gordon and Hammond, 
which had common management and a substantial overlap of stock 
ownership, should be treated as a single corporation for purposes of 
the insurance policy. The Court found no justification for disregarding 
the separate corporate entities, indicating that this could be the result 
only "where the corporation is a sham, or is used to perpetrate decep-
tion to defeat a public policy. . . . "2 
§ll.lO. Medical service corporation: Participation of podiatrists. 
Godfrey v. Massachusetts Medical Service1 challenged the constitu-
tionality of certain aspects of the nonprofit medical service plan called 
Blue Shield.2 One provision of the General Laws indicates that Blue 
Shield may enter into contracts with "physicians, dentists, podiatrists 
and optometrists,"3 but another provision specifies that physicians 
shall have the right to participate.4 The plaintiffs claimed that the 
equal protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment 
were violated (l) by the statutory scheme that allows physicians but 
not podiatrists to participate in Blue Shield as of right, and (2) by the 
action of Blue Shield in excluding podiatrists from participation. The 
decision in this case is discussed in §16.6 infra, in the chapter on con-
stitutional law. 
B. LEGISLATION 
§ll.ll. Advance payments by insurers: Notice of statute of limita-
2 Id. at 106, 266 N.E.2d at 657, citing New England Theatres, Inc. v. Ol•·mpia The-
atres, Inc., 287 Mass. 485, 493, 192 N.E. 93, 97 (1934). 
§11.10. 1 1971 Mass.Adv.Sh.969,270N.E.2d804. 
2 The Blue Shield program is governed by various sections of G.L., c. 176B. 
3 Id. §4. When the present action first arose, Section 4 provided that a medical service 
corporation might enter into contracts with "physicians, dentists, chiropodists (podia-
trists) and optometrists"; but the Acts of 1970, c. 443; §§33, 34 eliminated all references 
to "chiropodist" and substituted "podiatrist." 
4 G.L., c. 176B, §7. 
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tions. Legislation enacted by the General Court in 19671 provided 
that with respect to claims or suits for damages arising out of bodily 
injury, property damage, or death, the potentially liable party (or his 
insurer) may advance money to pay bills on behalf of the claimant with-
out such payment affecting the question of ultimate liability for such 
damages. Not only is the fact of such payment inadmissible evidence 
on the issue of liability, it is also inadmissible on the issue of mitiga-
tion of damages. However, such payments may be credited against any 
judgment obtained relating to the claim. 
Chapter 141 of the Acts of 1971 adds the requirement that an insurer 
(but not a person otherwise potentially liable) who makes such pay-
ments shall, at the time of making such payment, give written notice 
to the claimant of the statute of limitations applicable to his claim and 
the time within which he must commence an action to enforce such 
claim. Strict compliance with the notice provision is sought by the 
somewhat curious legislative technique of specifying that in the case of 
advance payments made without timely notice, the date on which the 
cause of action on the basic claim accrues is delayed until the notice is 
in fact given. This penalty for noncompliance apparently applies 
equally to the insurer and the person principally liable. On the other 
hand, if the insurer gives timely and otherwise proper notice when 
making the advance payment, the cause of action would presumably 
accrue as usual, that is, at the time of the occurrence which gave rise 
to the damages, rather than at the time the notice was given. 
The intent of this legislation is to warn claimants that although they 
may have received some payments, they must still press their claims by 
appropriate legal means. Although the legislative goal is worthy, the 
legislative scheme for accomplishing this end must be characterized as 
peculiar and likely to produce future litigation. For instance, what of 
the situation where the judgment entered against the person princi-
pally liable is for an amount in excess of his policy limits, but the 
action would have been barred by the appropriate statute of limitations 
if it were not for the failure of the insurer to give the required notice? 
§ll.l2. Group insurance: Public employees. The General Laws 
provide substantially similar group insurance coverage for active and 
retired employees of the Commonwealth (Chapter 32A) and of its 
municipal units (Chapter 32B). The legislative history of these chap-
ters discloses the liberal trend in employee fringe benefit legislation 
that has become characteristic in recent years. This history also indi-
cates that amendments to these chapters have been made in a remark-
ably unsystematic manner. The 1971 SuRVEY year illustrates this well, 
for no less than seven separate chapters of the Acts of 1971 have effected 
amendments to Chapters 32A and 32B, although most of the amend-
ments are of a relatively minor nature. 
Chapter 166 of the Acts of 1971 adds a provision to Chapter 32A 
which, subject to rules promulgated by the Massachusetts Group In-
§II.! I. I G.L.,c.231,§140B. 
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surance Commissioner, permits covered employees to treat the various 
types of group coverage provided by Chapter 32A as separable and to 
apply for selected types and amounts of coverages. 1 
Prior to the passage of Chapter 825 of the Acts of 1971,2 there was 
a substantial reduction upon retirement with respect to the type and 
amount of certain basic group coverages (life insurance, accidental 
death and dismemberment insurance, etc.) available to employees of 
the Commonwealth. The effect of the 1971 amendment is to allow an 
employee to maintain after retirement, on a 50 percent contributory 
basis, many of the benefits enjoyed during active employment. 
Chapter 791 of the Acts of 19713 provides for payment by the Com-
monwealth of 50 percent of the group health insurance premium re-
quired to be paid to continue such health insurance coverage for the 
spouse (and certain dependents) of a deceased or retired employee. 
Prior to this amendment, the surviving spouse was required to pay the 
entire cost of the insurance. 
Chapter 432 of the Acts of 19714 amends Chapters 32A and 32B in 
virtually identical ways. The general legislative scheme of both chap-
ters provides (with minor differences between the chapters) that a por-
tion of the dividends, refunds, or rate credits relating to the group 
insurance, in excess of certain administrative costs, be used for the 
benefit of the persons covered by the various group policies. Prior to 
the 1971 amendments, the persons who might be so benefited were 
only the "insured employees." This category has now been expanded 
to include "retired employees." 
Chapter 167 of the Acts of 1971 extends the time during which an 
active or retired employee may be covered by the optional group life 
and group accidental death and dismemberment insurance provided 
under Chapter 32B.5 Coverage now applies until the time the insured 
reaches age 70. 
The Acts of .1971 also amended Chapter 32B so as to authorize appro-
priate governmental units to provide for group disability income in-
surance covering nonoccupational injury or disease.6 One-half of the 
cost of the benefit will be paid by the insured, and the remainder will 
be contributed by the governmental unit involved. 
§ll.l3. Regulation of insurers: Authorized investments. For gen-
erations, life insurance companies were models of ultraconservative 
investment practice. However, recent years have witnessed a dramatic 
expansion of the types of activities engaged in and the types of invest-
ments held. Chapter 218 of the Acts of 1971 relates to the latter category 
and amends G.L., c. 175 by adding Section 66E; which expressly 
§ll.l2. 1 Acts of 1971, c. 166, amending G.L., c. 32A, §6. G.L., c. 32B, §5 was 
amended in an identical fashion by Acts of 1970, c. 269. 
2 AmendingG.L., c. 32A, §10. 
3 Amending G.L., c. 32A, §II. 
4 Amending G.L., c. 32A, §§9, 9A and G.L., c. 32B, §SA. 
5 Acts of 1971, c. 167, amending G.L., c. 32B, §llA. G.L., c. 32A, §lOA was amended in 
the same manner by Acts of 1969, c. 229. 
6 Acts of 197I,c. 203, §2, amendingG.L., c. 32B by adding§IIF. 
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authorizes the acquisition and holding of limited partnership interests 
of all kinds by domestic life insurance companies. The new section 
does, however, contain quantitative limits, specifying that no acqui-
sition of a limited partnership interest may be made if the cost would 
exceed 2 percent of the company's total assets or if such cost, plus the 
book value of all other limited partnership interests held by the com-
pany, would exceed 10 percent of the company's total assets. 
In point of fact, several of the large domestic life insurance companies 
have held limited partnership interests for some time, feeling that such 
investments were authorized by G.L., c. 175, §§66, 66A, or 66B. To 
other companies, however, the question of whether such authority 
existed was substantial enough to cause them to refrain from making 
such investments. In short, the issue was confused. The 1971 amend-
ment, which authorizes the holding of limited partnership interests 
acquired at an earlier date as well as the acquisition of new interests, 
has put the matter to rest. 
§11.14. Regulation of insurers: Crime of criminal usury. During 
the 1971 SuRVEY year, legislation was enacted defining criminal usury 
as the receipt by the lender, from or on account of the borrower, of in-
terest and expenses exceeding "twenty per centum per annum upon the 
sum loaned." 1 The definition was expressly made inapplicable to 
"any corporation subject to control, regulation or examination by 
any state or federal agency." A further provision exempted any lender 
who notified the attorney general of his intent to make loans that other-
wise would be criminally usurious. Although insurance companies 
rarely loaned money at a rate exceeding 20 percent, and although the 
statute appeared to exempt insurance companies inasmuch as they are 
regulated by their domiciliary state's insurance department,2 there 
were instances when insurance companies deemed it prudent to notify 
the attorney general pursuant to the statute, particularly when the 
intended loans would involve convertible debt or warrants to purchase 
common stock. 
Chapter 368 of the Acts of 1971 has amended the criminal usury law 
so as to exempt any "lender" (formerly any "corporation") subject to 
control, regulation, or examination by any state or federal "regulatory" 
agency (the word "regulatory" has also been added). The first change 
expands the scope of the exemption to apply to such lenders as busi-
ness trusts, limited partnerships, and individuals. The second change, 
by defining "agency" in a meaningful way, should satisfy even the 
most cautious that insurance companies may rely on the statutory 
exemption, for state insurance departments are clearly state regulatory 
agencies. 
§11.15. Optional uninsured motor vehicle coverage: Establishment 
of rates. General Laws, c. 175, §113C requires insurers, as a condi-
tion of issuing compulsory motor vehicle liability policies or acting 
§11.14. 1 Acts of 1970, c. 826, amendingG.L., c. 271 by adding§49. 
2 The apparent exemption for insurance companies would arise under G.L., c. 271, 
§49(e). 
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as surety on motor vehicle liability bonds in Massachusetts, to offer 
certain specified minimum amounts of various types of automobile 
insurance coverage to persons purchasing such policies or bonds. Chap-
ter 520 of the Acts of 1971 makes Section 113C applicable to uninsured 
motor vehicle insurance coverage. It requires that, as of January I, 
1972, there be so offered at least $15,000 of uninsured motor vehicle 
insurance coverage on account of injury to or death of one person, and 
$40,000 on account of any one accident resulting in multiple injuries 
or death. This optional insurance is to be additional coverage beyond 
the mandatory uninsured motor vehicle coverage required by G.L., c. 
175, §ll3L. However, the additional amount of insurance chosen must 
not exceed the amount of optional bodily injury coverage also pur-
chased under Section ll3C. 
Acts of 1971, c. 896, §l effects a further amendment to Section 113C 
by specifying that the rates for all the types of optional coverage in-
cluded in Section ll3C be established by the commissioner, after public 
hearings, in accordance with the terms of G.L., c. 175, §ll3B. 
§11.16. Miscellaneous acts. The General Laws limit the charges 
which may be made of an insured by insurance premium finance agen-
cies.1 Chapter 148 of the Acts of 19712 indicates that charges for 
group credit life insurance covering the debt incurred by the insured 
shall not be deemed to be a charge in violation of the applicable statu-
tory provision so long as the charge is less, generally, than "fifty cents 
per one hundred dollars per year of the sum of the agreed monthly 
installments contracted to be paid .... " 
The numerous kinds of theft insurance policies often specify that 
recovery is dependent upon "visible signs of forcible entry" accompany-
ing the theft. Such provisions are included so as to protect insurers 
against "inside jobs" and from the type of frauds that would other-
wise inevitably occur. While such provisions are reasonable limitations 
of liability on the part of the insurer, they often act to preclude recovery 
with respect to meritorious claims when the required visible signs of 
forcible entry cannot be established. Chapter 532 of the Acts of 19713 
represents an at.tempt to aid claimants with respect to the theft of per-
sonal articles from locked automobiles or trailers by specifying that 
"the fact that such motor vehicle or trailer was stolen shall be prima 
facie evidence that there was a forcible entry." (Emphasis added.) 
General Laws, c. 175, §ll3H established the assigned risk pool, by 
which "applicants for insurance who are in good faith entitled to and 
are unable to procure thraugh ordinary methods motor vehicle liability 
insurance" may obtain such insurance. Chapter 656 of the Acts of 1971 
adds two sentences to Section ll3H that call for the imposition of fines 
on any insurance agent or broker or any insurance company or officer 
thereof who places an insured in such an assigned risk pool because of 
age, sex, race, creed, color, occupation, or principal place of garaging. 
§11.16. 1 G.L., c. 255C, §14, by reference toG.L., c. 175, §162B. 
2 Adding§14A toG.L., c. 255C. 
3 Adding§791 toG.L., c. 233. 
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General Laws, c. 175, §lllE, prior to the adoption of Chapter 849 
of the Acts of 1971, authorized, with the prior written approval of the 
commissioner of insurance, the issuance of professional liability 
coverage for bodily injury and property damage covering the members 
of a charitable corporation formed under Massachusetts law and having 
at least 25,000 members, of whom not less than 75 percent were covered. 
The 1971 amendment reduces the membership requirement from 25,000 
to 500. 
C. No-FAULT AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE 
§11.17. Introduction. During the 1971 SURVEY year, the Massachu-
setts no-fault auto insurance plan,1 the first in the nation, became 
effective. In view of the drastic departure from traditional tort liability 
concepts accomplished by the plan, the paucity of both judicial and 
legislative action on the subject has been somewhat surprising.2 The 
most significant occurrence, and the only judicial pronouncement 
dealing with no-fault, was the decision of the Supreme Judicial Court 
in Pinnick v. C leary3 sustaining the validity of the plan in the face of 
sweeping constitutional challenges. Although there was a host of 
legislative proposals to modify or repeal no-fault, all but one were re-
jected,4 and the legislature demonstrated its continued faith in the 
no-fault concept by enacting a no-fault property damage plan to take 
effect on January 1, 1972.5 Moreover, the apparent success of the Per-
sonal Injury Protection plan in reducing insurance company costs 
prompted the legislature to enact two statutes, one designed to return 
to Massachusetts compulsory automobile insurance policyholders 
§11.17. 1 G.L., c. 90, §§34M, 34N; G.L., c. 175, §§22E-22H, all of which were in-
serted by Acts of 1970, c. 670. 
2 Although judicial and legislative action in Massachusetts has been subdued, the 
no-fault debate has been vigorously pursued by commentators and by legislatures in 
other states. See, e.g., Symposium on Nonfault Automobile Insurance, 71 Colum. L. 
Rev. 189 (1971); Danzig, The Fault with "No Fault," 7 Trial Lawyers Q. 4 (1970); Law-
ton, Psychological Aspects of the Fault System as Compared with the No-Fault System 
of Automobile Insurance, 20 Kan. L. Rev. 57 (1971); Simoneu and Sargent, Minnesota 
Plan: A Responsible Alternative to No-Fault Insurance, 55 Minn. L. Rev. 991 (1971); 
Fournier, No Fault System: Social Protection Insurance: A New Approach to an Old 
Problem, 38 Ins. Counsel]. 139 (1971); Tanney, Is No Fault Insurance Best for Florida?, 
45 Fla. B.J. 186 (1971); Dacey, "No Fault"-End of a Civilized Tort System, 6 New 
Eng. L. Rev. 79 (1970). 
No-fault automobile insurance plans have been recently enacted in several states. 
Del. Code Ann., tit. 21, §2118 (Supp. 1971); Fla. Laws 1971, c. 252, §§1-14; Ill. Ann. Stat., 
c. 73, §§1065.150 et seq. (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1972); Ore. Laws and Res. 1971, c. 523, 
§§1-12; P.R. Law~ Ann., tit. 9, §§2051-2065 (Supp. 1970). South Dakota has enacted an 
optional no-fault insurance coverage supplementing the insured's regular motor 
vehicle liability insurance. 
3 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh.ll29, 271 N.E.2d592, discussedin§ll.l8 infra. 
4 Acts of 1971, c. 794 amended the no-fault personal injury statute to provide that in 
any case where an insured receives compensation under a wage continuation program 
and also receives benefits for the same purpose from another source (presumably dam-
ages for lost wages received in an action in tort), the insured will be entitled to reim-
burse the wage continuation program without loss of his standing under the program. 
5 Acts of 1971, cc. 978, 1079, discussedin§ll.l9 infra. 
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any "excess" or "unfair" profits earned by insurers, the other imposing 
a tax on increased insurer income attributable to the no-fault plan.6 
§11.18. Personal Injury Protection plan: Constitutional challenge. 
The essential feature of the Massachusetts no-fault automobile insur-
ance plan was challenged in the case of Pinnick v. Cleary. 1 The case 
was presented directly to the Supreme Judicial Court, upon a report 
by Justice Reardon, as a bill for declaratory relief. In the bill, the plain-
tiff attacked the constitutionality of Chapter 670 of the Acts of 1971, 
which had imposed the no-fault plan. The facts of the case were not in 
contention. Two days after the plan became effective, the plaintiff, 
Pinnick, was injured in an automobile accident caused "exclusively 
by the negligence of the defendant." The common law tort damages 
of the plaintiff would have consisted of $115 expended for reasonable 
and necessary medical costs, $650 in lost wages, and $800 for alleged 
pain and suffering-a total claim of $1565. Both the plaintiff and the 
defendant were insured, each with coverage as provided by Chapter 
670. The defendant, in response to a demand brought against him in 
the amount of the plaintiff's claim, pleaded Chapter 670 in defense. 
The defendant claimed that the plaintiff must seek from his own insurer 
benefits up to $2000 before proceeding against a tort-feasor, and that 
since the plaintiff's medical expenses did not exceed $500, he was not 
entitled to claim pain and suffering as an element of his damages. The 
Court, in an opinion by Justice Reardon, held that the no-fault auto-
mobile insurance plan as applied to the plaintiff was not invalid with 
respect to either the state or federal constitution, and that the defendant 
was not liable to the plaintiff for damages for pain and suffering or for 
damages for which the plaintiff was compensated under the no-fault 
plan. 
In reaching its holding, the Court first summarized the basic pro-
visions of the no-fault plan, "not as a holding or ruling on any part 
of the statute, but only to permit a better understanding" of the Court's 
opinion.2 The essential feature of the plan is the provision for Per-
sonal Injury Protection benefit payments, which are made by the in-
surer to the insured or others who are entitled to collect in his right 
for specified expenses up to $2000 as they accrue, without regard to 
fault on the part of the insured. Among the specified expenses are those 
for medical costs, costs for household services ordinarily rendered by 
the injured party, and 75 percent of lost wages. To the extent the in-
sured receives benefits up to $2000, he foregoes any rights he may have 
6 Acts of 1971, c. 977, §2 directs the commissioner of insurance to hold hearings to 
determine the existence and extent of unfair profit from compulsory liability insurance 
and to direct the return of such profits in an appropriate manner to the policyholders. 
Acts of 1971, c. 555, §27A imposes a new excise tax on increased income earned by insurers 
as a result of the enactment of no-fault. 
§11.18. 1 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1129,271 N.E.2d592. 
2Jd. at 1136, 271 N.E.2d at 599. The summary of the provisions of Chapter 670 in 
the text is taken from the Court's opinion and includes only selected portions of the 
no-fault statute. · 
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to a tort recovery against a tort-feasor. Expenses in excess of $2000 as 
well as the difference between the plaintiff's actual loss of wages and 
the 75 percent recovery under no-fault may be recovered in a common 
law action in tort, but pain and suffering are not compensable unless 
the reasonable and necessary medical expenses of the plaintiff are 
greater than $500 or unless the plaintiff suffers death, dismemberment, 
permanent and serious disfigurement, fracture, or loss of sight or hear-
mg. 
The Court first found it necessary to contend with the plaintiff's 
arguments that the common law action in tort had the status of a 
"vested property right," and further that the tort action was protected 
by the Bill of Rights as being a necessary safeguard for the protection 
of the "right of personal security and bodily integrity," a right alleged-
ly recognized in Griswold v. Connecticut. 3 In answering the first 
argument, the Court relied upon the proposition that "[n]o person 
has a vested interest in any rule of law entitling him to insist that it 
shall remain unchanged for his benefit,"4 and the justices could find 
no provision of the Massachusetts Constitution that would require a 
different result. 5 The plaintiff's Griswold argument was disposed of 
by the Court as being "inapposite." Unable to find a factor that would 
distinguish the legislature's alteration of the tort action from any 
other legislative alteration of preexisting common law rights, the Court 
concluded that "the principles by which Chapter 670 should be judged 
are those generally applied when economic and social regulations 
enacted under the police power are attacked as a violation of due pro-
cess and equal protection of the laws. " 6 
In discussing the due process issues, the Court looked to whether the 
no-fault law bore a reasonable relation to a permitted legislative pur-
pose and whether the law provided a reasonable and adequate substi-
In its summary of the statute, the Court described the wage benefit payable under no-
fault to an unemployed person as follows: "[H)e is entitled to the same percentage of 
wages he can prove he would have received from work he would have had had he not 
been injured." Id. at 1133-1134, 271 N.E.2d at 597. Although dictum, the above-quoted 
passage indicates that the Court read Chapter 670 as explicitly modifying the traditional 
tort rule with respect to "loss by reason of dimunition of earning power," as expounded, 
for example, in Doherty v. Ruiz, 302 Mass. 145, 18 N.E.2d 542 (1939). The Court seems 
to have adopted the view that the proper measure of damages would be amounts 
"actually lost by reason of the accident." The conclusion that is implicit in the above-
quoted dictum was reached by this author in 1970 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §22.7. 
'38HJ .S. 479,486 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
4 As authority for the quoted· proposition, the Court cited New York Central R.R. v. 
White, 243 U.S.' 188 (1917) (holding constitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment 
due process clause the New York workmen's compensation statute, which altered the 
common law rights and liabilities of employer and employee in personal injury cases), 
and Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876) (rejecting a Fourteenth Amendment due process 
challenge to an Illinois statute establishing the maximum rate that public warehouse-
men were permitted to charge for the storing and handling of grain). 
5 The Court declined to follow Commonwealth v. Boston Transcript Co., 249 Mass. 
477, 144 N.E. 400 (1924), to the extent that dictum in the opinion indicated that the 
legislature might be precluded from abolishing a given common law right of action. 
6 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1129, 1140,271 N .E.2d 592,601. 
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tution for the preexisting common law right that had been altered. 7 
The Court had no difficulty enumerating the "obvious" ills against 
which the no-fault law was directed. First and foremost was the impact 
on the judicial system of motor vehicle related litigation, measured 
both in terms of court time and in terms of the administrative burden 
placed on the court clerks. Other evils mentioned were the high cost 
of automobile insurance in Massachusetts, the low cost-to-benefit 
ratio prevailing in the automobile tort insurance system generally, 
and the unequal allocation of benefit payments among persons eligible 
to receive them. On the question of whether the law provided a reason-
able and adequate substitute remedy in place of the preexisting com-
mon law right, the Court drew an analogy between the principles 
underlying workmen's compensation legislation and the principle 
underlying no-fault legislation. Although admitting that the parallel 
was inexact, the Court nonetheless felt that the changes in rights 
effected by Chapter 670 could be described in the same terms as the 
changes effected by workmen's compensation.8 Under Chapter 670, 
motorists receive lower insurance rates and rapid payment of compen-
sation up to $2000. In return for these benefits, the nonnegligent driver 
limits his right to damages for pain and suffering. The negligent driver, 
or the driver whose negligence cannot be determined, receives an addi-
tional benefit in that he will receive the same payments up to $2000 
as were received by the nonnegligent driver, will be sheltered from 
claims against him by nonnegligent drivers up to $2000, and will be 
free from liability for pain and suffering claims to the extent the plain-
tiff is not permitted to sue therefor. The exchange of rights in cases in-
volving pedestrians was also considered by the Court: 
Pedestrians, too, may be negligent or non-negligent; they, too, 
are therefore afforded the certainty of prompt recovery of a limited 
amount and limited exemption from liability instead of the neces-
sity of tort proceedings or no compensation at all and liability 
to an unlimited amount.9 
In its discussion of the equal protection issues, the Court was con-
cerned with whether the classifications drawn by the legislature were 
reasonably related to a permissible public purpose or whether they 
were arbitrary, irrational, or invidiously discriminatory. The Court 
considered whether the purpose of eliminating minor claims for pain 
and suffering was a proper legislative objective. Again referring to the 
1 The Court declined to discuss the circumstances under which a legislature might 
abrogate a common law right of recovery without fashioning a statutory remedy as a sub-
stitute, although the power of the legislature to do so had be~n discussed in Opinion of 
the Justices, 309 Mass. 571, 34 N.E.2d 527 (1941). The Court also declined to offer an 
opinion on whether its reasonable substitution test was constitutionally required. 1971 
Mass. Adv. Sh. 1129, 1148 n.l6, 271 N.E.2d 592, 605 n.l6. 
8 In particular, the Court drew upon New York Central R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 
(1917), which held constitutional the institution of workmen's compensation in New 
York. 
9 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1129, 1150,271 N.E.2d592, 607. 
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"crisis faced by the courts of the Commonwealth and the part played 
by the abundance of personal injury claims in contributing to it," the 
Court concluded that the legislature "could reasonably have thought 
that the number of such cases was largely attributable to speculative 
and exaggerated claims for pain and suffering in instances of relatively 
minor injury." To eliminate minor claims effectively, objective and 
easily applicable rules were necessary. The Court concluded that the 
rules actually selected by the legislature were rationally related to 
eliminating the claims, and that the $500 medical expense limit and 
the exceptions recognized thereto were "rationally related to serious-
ness of injury in general, and thereby to seriousness of pain and suffer-
ing." The selection of the $500 limit was reasonable enough so as not 
to be subject to attack. 
In a separate concurring opinion, the Chief Justice stated that he 
was disagreeing with much of the reasoning employed by the majority 
and was concurring on the ground that the presumption of constitu-
tional validity had not been overcome by the plaintiff. The Chief Jus-
tice took issue with what he considered to be the lauding of no-fault 
and questioned whether the majority was in a position to weigh the 
desirability or wisdom of the plan. The Chief Justice, though he con-
curred in the result, declared that he 
would remand this case to the Superior Court for the purpose of 
conducting an appropriate judicial inquiry into those contro-
verted facts, beyond the sphere of judicial notice, upon which the 
existence of a rational basis for the no-fault insurance plan and 
the classification system contained within it might depend. 10 
As the first case involving a judicial examination of no-fault auto-
mobile insurance, Pinnick will undoubtedly receive much scrutiny by 
practitioners, legislators, and the judiciary. Although the discussion 
in the majority opinion is broad in scope, the holding of the case is 
explicitly restricted to the facts before the Court; the concurring opin-
ion of the Chief Justice points out a number of countervailing consid-
erations that the majority did not choose to address in its opinion. 
Although the basic concept of no-fault insurance has passed the con-
stitutional test in Massachusetts, it is submitted that there may be 
particular applications of the concept that will be subject to further 
constitutional scrutiny by the Supreme Judicial Court. 
§11.19. No-fault property damage plan. The apparent success of 
the no-fault personal injury plan encouraged the Massachusetts legis-
lature to extend some of the principles of compensation without fault 
to cases involving property damage caused by automobiles. The new 
property damage plan was enacted as Chapter 978 of the Acts of 1971 1 
and was promptly amended by Chapter 1097.2 It should be noted at 
10 Idat 1167-1168,271 N.E.2d at617. 
§11.19. 1 Acts of 1971, c. 978, §I, amendingG.L., c. 90, by inserting§34. 
2Actsof 1971, c. 1097, §§2, 3, amendingG.L., c. 90, §34. 
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the outset that it is inaccurate to refer to the new property damage plan 
as being a no-fault plan, that is, one that entitles claimants under the 
plan to payment in compensation of damage to their automobiles 
whether or not the claimant was at fault. What the new plan does is to 
replace the traditional third-party tort compensation system with a 
direct, first-party system for the payment of most vehicle damages 
resulting from accidents between Massachusetts operators. 
Basic provisions. Chapter 978 provides that every person who has 
in force a policy or bond with respect to motor vehicle liability must 
also maintain "property protection insurance" as defined by the act. 
The coverage of property protection insurance is described in terms 
similar to those describing the traditional Massachusetts compulsory 
property damage liability insurance: 
[T]he insurer will pay on behalf of the insured all sums the in-
sured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of 
injury to or destruction of property ... caused by accident and 
arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use ... of the in-
sured motor vehicle, subject to a limit of not less than [$5000] be-
cause of injury to ... property of others in any one accident. 3 
In addition to the above coverage, every policyholder must elect one of 
three options offered by property protection insurance policies: 
(l) All-risk coverage provides that the insurer will compensate the 
policyholder for any direct and accidental loss of or damage to the 
vehicle covered by the policy in force, which loss or damage is "caused 
by collision of the insured vehicle with another object or with a vehicle 
to which it is attached, or by upset of the insured vehicle. " 4 Benefits 
under all-risk coverage are to be paid "without regard to negligence, 
comparative negligence, gross negligence or fault of any kind."5 
(2) Restricted coverage provides that only in certain specified cases 
will the insurer compensate the policyholder for accidental loss of or 
damage to the vehicle covered by property protection insurance. The 
instances in which compensation will be paid are as follows: (a) where 
the policyholder would have been entitled, except for the exemption 
from liability granted by the statute, to recover his damages by an 
action in tort against another identified person who is also covered 
by property protection insurance; (b) where the policyholder is en-
titled to a tort recovery for damages against another identified person 
not exempt from liability under the statute; in this case, the policy-
holder is under a duty to take all steps required to preserve the right of 
subrogation of the insurer; (c) where the insured vehicle is lawfully 
parked and the damage is caused by being struck by a vehicle owned by 
another identified person;6 (d) where the insured vehicle is involved in 
3 Acts of 1971, c. 978, §I. 
4 ld. c. 1097' §2. 
5 Id. c. 978, §I. 
6 The requirement that the insured vehicle be "lawfully parked" may lead to some 
nice questions of statutory construction. If "lawfully" is strictly construed, one's 
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a rear end collision with another vehicle owned by an identified person 
who was traveling in the same direction; (e) where the operator of the 
vehicle causing the accident is, "as a result of his operation at the time 
the loss or damage was incurred," convicted of being under the influ-
ence of a drug (alcohol or narcotics) or is convicted of a moving traffic 
violation; in the event, however, that the operator of the insured ve-
hicle is himself convicted of the enumerated offenses as a result of his 
operation of his vehicle at the time of the accident, the coverage under 
(e) disappears. 
Restricted coverage is intended to have tli.e same general effect as that 
of the tort compensation system: the person who is damaged through 
the greater negligence of another recovers his damages. Payments 
under restricted coverage provisions (c), (d), or (e) are to be made re-
gardless of whether the insured, under usual tort principles, would 
have been entitled to recover damages from another person; any such 
payment to which the insured becomes entitled may not be lessened by 
a showing of facts that would have been a· basis for the application of 
principles of comparative negligence. Restricted coverage payments 
under provisions (a) and (b) are not to exceed the amounts payable 
under a tort action for damages to the vehicle, and the deductible 
(if any) is to be taken into account in full as a deduction against the 
amount that would have otherwise been recoverable in tort. The pay-
ments from the insurer under all-risk and restricted coverages are sub-
ject to a $100 or $50 "deductible"; the amount of the payments is 
limited to the actual cash value of the vehicle less such deductible. The 
statute was written with the expectation that all parties subject to it 
would elect some amount of deductible. 
(3) No coverage for own car provides that the policyholder is not 
entitled to property protection insurance payments for damage to his 
own vehicle. Under this coverage, the policyholder gives up the right 
to recover for damages to his own vehicle from others insured under 
property protection insurance, and in return the policyholder is 
"exempt from liability to such persons" as provided by the statute. 
In return for the motorist's acceptance of a limited property damage 
recovery under the three available options, Chapter 978 provides: 
Every owner, authorized operator or other person legally respon-
sible for the operation of any vehicle to which [the statute] applies 
... shall be exempt from all liability [that any] property pro-
tection insurance policyholder and his insurer might otherwise 
have been entitled to claim ... for accidental loss of or damage 
to any vehicle to which this [statute] applies.7 
insurance coverage would expire at the same moment as one's time at the parking meter 
or at the instant one left one's car in. a no-parking zone. If "parked" is strictly construed, 
coverage would not exist if one were merely sitting in a motionless car with the motor 
running. It is submitted that for the purposes of the act, "lawfully parked': ought to be 
read as comprehending any time the insured vehicle is motionless at the side of the road 
or off the road. 
7 Acts of 1971, c. 978, §I. 
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The effect of the above exemption provision is to eliminate any re-
course to the common law action in tort for any damage to vehicles 
in accidents involving only persons subject to the property protection 
insurance plan. 
Additional provisions., There are some additional provisions of the 
statute that are worthy of note: 
(a) For the first time, insurers must offer, at the option of the 
policyholder, coverage for the loss of the use of an insured vehicle as a 
result of an accident. 
(b) Payments under all-risk coverage or provisions (c), (d), and 
(e) of restricted coverage are due and payable 15 days after the insurer 
has received reasonable proof that the claimant is a policyholder, that 
an accident occurred, and that damage to or loss of the vehicle was 
suffered in the claimed amount. Failure of the insurer to pay within 
such period entitles the insured to commence an action in contract for 
payments claimed to be due, and if the court finds such failure to have 
been unreasonable, it shall award the claimant double the amount of 
claimed damages plus costs and reasonable attorney's fees. 
(c) Where one of the vehicles, involved in the accident is not a 
private passenger vehicle as defined by the commissioner of insurance, 
the right of subrogation exists with respect to an insurer who makes 
payments under all-risk or restricted coverage. 
D. STUDENT CoMMENT 
§11.20. Sufficiency of Massachusetts casualty insurance rate regula-
tory provisions under the McCarran Act: Fleming v. Travelers Indem-
nity Co. 1 The insurance industry, as an element of interstate commerce, 
is naturally subject to federal regulation. Congress, however, by 
enacting the McCarran-Ferguson Act2 (hereinafter called the McCar-
ran Act), expressed its willingness to limit federal control over the 
industry to the extent that the states would assume the task of regula-
tion. Since the passage of the McCarran Act in 1945, its call for state 
regulation has been met with Vqrying legislative responses. In Fleming, 
the regulatory scheme adopted by Massachusetts was attacked on the 
ground that it failed to meet the standards contemplated by Congress. 
The plaintiff argued, and this comment will attempt to show, that 
Congress did not call upon the states merely to enact regulatory legis-
lation, but rather that Congress intended to confer control over the 
business of insurance only where the states acted to regulate affirma-
tively. 
The Massachusetts Casualty and Surety Rate Regulatory Law3 pro-
§11.20. 1 324 F. Supp.l404 (D. Mass. 1971). 
2 15 u.s.c. §§1011-1015. 
3 G.L., c. 175A. As regards automobile insurance, the chapter concerns only noncom-
pulsory coverage. Rates for compulsory coverage are set under Chapter 175, Sections 113A-
113L. These rates cannot be effective until approved by the commissioner in accordance 
with Section 113A. Chapter 175A also applies, inter alia, to various types of homeowner's 
insurance, including property, theft, and liability, but not including fire insurance. 
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vides for the setting of insurance rates in the following manner. First, 
the law permits the insurance companies to enter into rating organiza-
tions.4 The organizations allow subscribing companies to pool the 
expenses involved in compiling a rate structure. Moreover, the rating 
organizations can frequently determine rates far more efficiently than 
can an individual company. The rate uniformity resulting from the 
use of rating organizations may also serve to protect policyholders 
by discouraging excessive price competition and thus promoting 
solvency and stability within the industry. To this end, cooperation 
among rating organizations or among rating organizations and in-
dividual companies is also authorized.5 
After the rate structure has been compiled, the rates are filed with 
either the commissioner of insurance or his designated representa-
tive.6 The filing must state the type of coverage contemplated and the 
date when the new rates are to become effective. Although the effec-
tive date may not precede the filing date, the rates may go into effect 
without prior approval. This is the "file and use" provision, which 
permits the insurance companies to begin using the rates as soon as 
they have been filed. Subsequent to the filing, the commissioner may, 
at his discretion, review the filings and request additional supporting 
data. The applicable statute, however, provides him with only gen-
eral standards to apply in conducting his review.7 If at any time he 
should determine that the rates filed are not consistent with those 
statutory standards, the commissioner is empowered to call a hearing 
(upon not less than ten days' notice) and afterward to issue an order 
disapproving the rates, indicating the date when they will cease to 
apply, and specifying the reasons for the disapproval.8 
In Fleming, the plaintiff's claim arose out of a situation in which 
certain insurance companies, including the defendant, had filed for a 
rate increase through a rating organization. The increase was to be 
effective the same day as the filing. The commissioner of insurance 
• G.L., c. 175A, §8. 
s Id.§S(d). 
6 Id. §6(a) provides in part: "Every insurer shall file with the commissioner or his des-
ignated representative every manual of classifications, rules and rates, every rating plan 
and every modification of any of the foregoing which it proposes to use. Every such filing 
shall state the effective date thereof, ,hhich shall not be prior to the filing date, and such 
filing shall indicate the character and extent of the coverage contemplated. The commis-
sioner may require such insurer to furnish the information upon which it supports such 
filing .... " 
7 Id. §5 provides in part: "(a) All rates shall be made in accordance with the following 
provisions:-
"!. Due consideration shall be given to past and prospective loss experience, within and 
outside this commonwealth, to catastrophe hazards, if any, to a reasonable margin for un-
derwriting profit and contingencies, to investment income on unearned premium reserves 
and loss reserves, to dividends, savings or unabsorbed premium deposits allowed or re-
turned by insurers to their policy holders, members or subscribers, to past and prospective 
expenses both countrywide and those specially applicable to this commonwealth, and to 
all other relevant factors within and outside this commonwealth. . . . 
"4. Rates shall not be excessive, inadequate or unfairly discriminatory.'' 
8 ld. §7(a). 
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disapproved the increase but did not call a hearing. On appeal by the 
insurance companies, the Supreme Judicial Court found the disapprov-
al to be procedurally defective and held that the rate increase had been 
continuously in effect since the date designated in the filing. 9 Subse-
quent to the Court's decision, the plaintiff in Fleming brought his 
complaint, alleging that the insurance companies had acted illegally 
in combination and that the Massachusetts "file and use" procedure 
had allowed the companies, in effect, to operate outside of any state 
regulation. Such lack of regulation, claimed the plaintiff, should 
render the insurance companies subject to federal antitrust laws in 
accordance with the following provision of the McCarran Act: 
No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or 
supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regu-
lating the business of insurance, or which imposes a fee or tax 
upon such business, unless such Act specifically relates to the 
business of insurance: Provided, That after June 30, 1948, the Act 
of July 2, 1890, as amended, known as the Sherman Act, and the 
Act of October 15, 1914, as amended, known as the Clayton Act, 
and the Act of September 26, 1914, known as the Federal Trade 
Commission Act, as amended, shall be applicable to the business 
of insurance to the extent that such business is not regulated by 
State law. 10 [Emphasis added.) 
The defendant insurance companies argued that the Massachusetts 
"file and use" provision had been enacted in order to regulate the in-
surance industry, and that plaintiff's claim was essentially directed 
toward the wisdom of the legislation. In granting the defendants' 
motion to dismiss, the federal District Court for Massachusetts held 
that under the McCarran Act, if a state has legislated without sham or 
9 Insurance Rating Bd. v. Commissioner of Ins., 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1285, 260 N.E.2d 
922. Rates calling for a 26.9 percent increase for private cars and a 26.4 percent increase 
for commercial cars were filed December 24, 1969, to be effective the same day. Later that 
day, the commissioner wrote to the rating board, indicating that the "rule used by the 
board in determining the effective date of the filing was entirely unclear, nebulous, and 
inconsistent," and that the data submitted to justify the increases was "insufficient, ... 
incomplete and does not justify any rate revision nor does it support the revision filed 
by ... (the board]." Id. at 1286, 260 N.E.2d at 923. Accordingly, the commissioner in-
formed the board that the rates were disapproved and that it could request a hearing un-
der G.L., c. 175A, §19(a). Five days later the commissioner again wrote the board. The 
next day, December 30, 1969, the board submitted a second filing calling for the same 
rates that had been disapproved by the commissioner on December 24. These rates were 
to take effect on December 31, 1969. Once again the commissioner disapproved the filing 
and notified the board of its right to a hearing under Section 19(a). The rating board then 
brought this bill in equity asking that the rates be declared effective as of December 31, 
1969. The Supreme Judicial Court found that Sections 6(a) and 7(a) "when read together, 
do not allow the commissioner to disapprove rates and thereby make them ineffective 
without a hearing." 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1285, 1288, 260 N.E.2d 922, 924. The commis-
sioner's power to request additional or supporting information "does not preclude the 
filing from taking effect, nor can it be used as the basis of any decision or ruling by the 
commissioner that the filing shall not take effect." Ibid. 
lO 15 u.s.c. §1012(b). 
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pretense, an allegation that the legislation is so ineffective as to neces-
sitate application of a federal statute is not a claim upon which relief 
can be granted. 11 The court construed the McCarran Act as requiring 
only that states prescribe "general standards of conduct" for the insur-
ance industry and "procedures for effectuating those standards." 12 
Since the McCarran Act itself contains no specific suggestions as to 
what kind of regulatory program the states are expected to adopt, the 
court found no reason for holding that a "file and use" provision was 
not contemplated. 13 In fact, under the interpretation adopted in this 
decision, any type of good faith legislation on the subject of insur-
ance rates would be sufficient to meet the requirements of the McCar-
ran Act. It is submitted, however, that Congress did not intend to be 
so lenient. More specifically, it is submitted that the Massachusetts 
"file and use" provision is not consistent with the Congressional- man-
date in the act. 
The McCarran Act was passed in response to United States v. South-
Eastern Underwriters Association 14 (hereinafter called SEUA), a 
decision designating the business of insurance as commerce and thus 
subject to federal regulations when conducted across state lines. For 
75 years prior to the decision, the industry had been operating out-
side federal regulation because of an earlier determination that insur-
ance was not commerce. 15 In SEUA, the Supreme Court noted that 
the bulk of the insurance industry was conducted by "comparatively 
few companies located, for the most part, in the financial centers of 
the East." 16 As a result, the flow of premium payments and policy 
disbursements invariably crossed state lines, even though the actual 
insurance contracts were generally written intrastate. Accordingly, 
the Court held: 
No commercial enterprise of any kind which conducts its activ-
ities across state lines has been held to be wholly beyond the 
regulatory power of Congress under the Commerce Clause. We 
cannot make an exception of the business of insurance. 17 
While the SEUA decision did not expressly prohibit state regulation 
of insurance, many states and insurance companies feared that it might 
have such an effect. 18 The McCarran Act was enacted to allay those 
fears and to give effect to the belief that state regulation of insurance 
was in the public interest. 19 However, in restoring this power to the 
states, Congress had no intention of allowing them to preempt the 
field. As will be discussed below, supporters of the McCarran Act did 
11 324 F. Supp. 1404, 1406. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. 
14 322 U.S. 533 ( 1944). 
15 Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1869). 
16 322 u.s. 533,541. 
17Id. at 553. 
18 H.R. Rep. No. 143, 79th Cong., lst Sess. (1945). 
19 15 U.S.C. §lOll. 
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not construe it to be inconsistent in any way with residual federal 
control over the insurance industry. 
There were various legislative alternatives with which Congress 
might have responded to the SEUA decision. An inquiry into the 
intent of Congress when it legislated the McCarran Act might thus 
begin with a consideration of those options which Congress refused 
to take. One such option was the Bailey-Van Nuys Bill,2° described 
in the Congressional Record as "a bill to affirm the intent of the Con-
gress that the regulation of the business of insurance remain within 
the control of the several States and that the acts of July 2, 1890, and 
October IS, 1914, as amended, be not applicable to that business .... " 21 
Earlier versions of the McCarran Act represented other legislative 
alternatives to the final form which the bill assumed. Like the Bailey-
Van Nuys measure, these earlier versions provided for little federal 
control over insurance. Specifically, they did not even contain the 
clause which was directly at issue in Fleming, namely, the proviso 
that federal regulations will be inapplicable only to the extent that the 
states have regulated.22 In fact, the Federal Trade Commission Act 
was to be inapplicable under any circumstances.23 The rejection of the 
aforementioned alternatives, coupled with the wording of Section 
IOI2(b)24 of the McCarran Act, indicates that Congress was unwilling 
to deny completely the applicability of the Sherman and Clayton Acts 
to the insurance business. 
The McCarran Act was passed nine months after the SEUA decision 
and contained a provision designed to give the states sufficient oppor-
tunity to enact regulatory programs in conformance with that deci-
sion.25 The provision suspended the applicability of the Sherman 
and Clayton Acts for three years, subject to exceptions for acts of boy-
cott, coercion, or intimidation.26 Implicit in the concept of the mora-
torium was the intention that the suspended controls would be avail-
able even after the states had enacted or improved their own regulatory 
systems. The House Judiciary Committee report explained that the 
purpose of the McCarran Act, in part, was 
to ensure a more adequate regulation of this business in the States 
2°S.l362, 78thCong., lstSess.(l943). 
21 89Cong. Rec. 7689 (1943). 
22 91 Cong. Rec. 478 (1945). The entire subsection (b) of Section 2 of the early versions 
of the McCarran Act read as follows: "No act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, 
impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the busi-
ness of insurance, or which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such act spe-
cifically so provides." 91 Cong. Rec. 478 (1945). The section was eventually amended to 
add the proviso relied upon by the plaintiff in the Fleming case. 
23 Ibid. Section 3 of this version of the McCarran Act stated simply that "Nothing con-
tained in the Act of September 26, 1914, known as the Federal Trade Commission Act, as 
amended ... shall apply to the business of insurance or to acts in the conduct of that 
business." 
"15 U.S.C. §1012(b). 
25 H.R.Rep.No.l43, 78thCong., lstSess.(l943). 
26 15 u.s. c. §1013. 
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by suspending the application of the Sherman and Clayton Acts 
for approximately two sessions of the State legislatures, so that 
the States and the Congress may consider legislation during that 
period. It should be noted that this bill, by the moratorium pro-
posed therein, does not repeal the Sherman and Clayton Acts. 27 
Those who opposed the legislation were concerned that the states 
were being awarded too much power, although even the opponents of 
the measure do not appear to have doubted that the states should play 
a major role in regulating insurance. Ironically, these opponents, led 
by Senator Pepper (D. Fla.), seem to have been motivated by a fear 
that Section l012(b) would be interpreted exactly as it has been and 
that the control exercised by the federal government would be danger-
ously reduced.28 Supporters of the bill argued at length that it did 
not diminish the role of the federal government: 
Mr. Murdock. [W]e convey no authority, we simply recognize 
their right to regulate. Insofar as they fail to cover the same ground 
covered by the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act, those acts be-
come effective again.29 
Perhaps the best indication of the attitude taken on the question of 
the respective powers of the state and federal governments is contained 
in the following exerpt from the Senate floor debate. The participants 
were Senator White (R. Me.), the Senate minority leader; Senator Mc-
Carran (D. Nev.), cosponsor of the McCarran Act and chairman of the 
judiciary committee (which had already considered the measure); and 
Senator Murdock (D. Utah), also a member of that committee. 
Mr. White. [I]s it not perfectly clear that the force and effect of 
these Federal statutes may be applicable and shall be applicable 
to whatever extent the State law fails to occupy the ground and 
engage in regulation? As I take it, there are two jurisdictions. 
Mr. McCarran. There always are. 
Mr. White. There is the State, authorized to act to whatever 
extent seems proper. 
Mr. McCarran. That is correct. 
Mr. White. Then the Federal Government can come in, and it 
does come in and may legislate beyond the limit of the State 
legislation. 
Mr. McCarran. To the extent that the State does not regulate. 
Mr. Murdock. Mr. President, does the Senator from Maine take 
the position that, under the conference report, it becomes neces-
sary for the Congress to act again affirmatively, subsequent to any 
State action taken? 
Mr. White. Not at all; that is not my view of the matter at all. 
My view is that the State may regulate. If, however, the State goes 
27 H.R. Rep. No. 143, 79th Cong., I st Sess. ( 1945 ). See also 91 Cong. Rec. 480 (1945 ). 
2s91 Cong.Rec.1444(1945). 
29 Ibid. 
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only to the point indicated, then these Federal statutes apply 
throughout the whole field beyond the scope of the State's activity. 
Mr. McCarran. That is a correct statement. 
Mr. Murdock. Without any subsequent action on the part of 
Congress? 
Mr. White. Without any subsequent action on the part of Con-
gress.30 
This exchange seems to reveal the feeling of the participants that 
state and federal regulations were to be complementary. 
An examination of the legislative history of the McCarran Act 
strongly indicates that a claim that a state's system of insurance rate 
regulation is ineffective should be actionable. A state should not be 
said to have regulated simply by virtue of the fact that it has legislated, 
even if the legislation was enacted in good faith. That the states were 
to some extent on trial follows inescapably from the history of the act. 
The record is replete with examples of the guarded manner in which 
Congress recognized the rights of the states to regulate insurance. 
Mr. Barkley.31 ••• I have reached the conclusion that by 
granting the moratorium . . . we are denying ourselves as a 
Congress no authority ultimately to deal with the subject.32 
Mr. O'Mahoney.33 [ L]et me say that one of the House confer-
ees ... used this sentence, which I thought was extremely apt: 
"This is a bill to authorize the States to regulate the insurance 
business; and if the States do not regulate it, the Federal Govern-
ment can. "34 
Mr. Murdock.[T]he conference report ... in my opinion, not 
only grants a moratorium but allows the States to come affirma-
tively into the picture. If they do something objectionable, some-
thing we do not want done, then Congress reserves the right to 
strike it down, and ... we could make both the Clayton Act and 
the Sherman Act applicable in their full vigor against anything 
the States might do.3s 
While these comments make it clear that state regulations had to mea-
sure up to certain standards, the exact manner in which a state could 
fulfill its responsibility under the McCarran Act is not so obvious. It 
seems beyond dispute, however, that any state legislation that per-
mitted abuses in the nature of those perpetrated by SEUA would be 
unacceptable. 36 
Senator Pepper, however, was not convinced. He referred to Section 
1012(b) as granting not a three-year moratorium but a "perpetual 
30 Ibid. 
31 Alben Barkley (D. Ky.), the Senate majority leader. 
32 91 Cong. Rec. 1488 ( 1945 ). 
33 Joseph C. O'Mahoney (D. Wyo.), third-ranking Democrat on the Senate Judiciary 
Committee. 
34 91 Cong. Rec.l486-1487 (1945). 
35 Id. at 1484. 
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moratorium," arguing that the section would be read to allow the 
states to preempt the fieldY Specifically, he was concerned that the 
states might permit abuses like those uncovered in the SEUA case. 
Senator Ferguson, a supporter of the bill, replied that neither the bill 
nor the SEUA decision had been designed to reverse the history of 
the insurance business, a history that revealed that unrestricted price 
competition among insurance companies was not in the public inter-
est. He added that the McCarran Act merely sought to prevent the 
excesses of rating organizations without abolishing the organizations 
completely. Accordingly, Senator Ferguson suggested that a state was 
free to authorize such organizations provided it also enacted means 
by which they could be regulated. 38 The states were, in effect, given 
the power to decide whether or not the antitrust laws mentioned in 
the act would apply, but that power was merely the option to decide 
whether or not they would regulate the insurance industry.39 
In lengthy correspondence with Senator Radcliffe, another suppor-
ter of the bill, President Roosevelt indicated the type of legislation 
that he expected to emerge during the moratorium. 
[T]here is no conflict between the application of the antitrust laws 
and effective State regulation of insurance companies, and there 
is no valid reason for giving any special exemption from the anti-
trust laws to the business of insurance. . . . The antitrust laws 
do not conflict with affirmative regulation of insurance by the 
States such as agreed insurance rates if they are affirmatively ap-
proved by State officials.40 [Emphasis added.] 
After signing the McCarran Act, the president declared: 
After the moratorium period, the antitrust laws ... will be ap-
plicable ... except to the extent that the States have assumed 
the responsibility, and are effectively performing that responsibil-
ity ... It is clear from the legislative history and language of this 
Act, that the Congress intended no grant of immunity from monop-
oly .... Congress did not intend to permit private rate fixing 
... but was willing to permit the actual regulation of rates by 
affirmative action of the states.41 
36 SEUA had been composed of nearly two hundred insurance companies, which alleg-
edly controlled 90 percent of the fire and "allied lines" of insurance in six southern states. 
The association was alleged to have conspired to fix premium rates and agents' commis-
sions; to have boycotted, coerced and intimidated nonmember companies into joining the 
association; and to have similarly caused persons needing insurance to buy only from 
SEUA members and on SEUA terms. 322 U.S. 533, 534-535. During the period from 1931 
to 1941, the insurance companies operating in these six states collected $488 million in 
premiums, while paying out only $215 million on policies. Id. at 542. 
' 7 91 Cong. Rec.l479( 1945). · 
38ld. at 1481. 
'
9 Id. at 1443. 
40 Id. at 482. 
41 The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt: 1944-1945, at 587 
(Rosenman ed. 1950), as cited in Rose, State Regulation of Property and Casualty Insur-
ance Rates, 28 Ohio St. L.J. 669, 706 (1967). 
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Apparently, the president felt that the states had to do more than simply 
legislate. They had to regulate and do so "affirmatively" and "effec-
tively." Those two terms appear frequently during the Senate discus-
sion of the bill, indicating that many supporters of the measure shared 
expectations similar to those of the president. What is more important, 
the Senate floor debate just prior to the passage of the act called into 
question the good faith legislation criterion utilized in the Fleming de-
CISIOn. 
Mr. Ferguson. After the moratorium has expired, if a State has 
not legislated on the subjects covered by the three acts to which 
reference has been made, those acts shall be applicable to the 
business of insurance. But insofar as the State ... has specifically 
legislated on the subject;the three acts shall not apply .... 
Mr. O'Mahoney. I believe the Senator from Michigan went a 
little further than was his intention [in saying] that if the States 
have legislated, certain things will take place. The bill says if the 
States have regulated. 
Mr. Ferguson. I had reference to legislation dealing with regu-
lation .... 
Mr. Barkley. I should like to ask, in this connection, whether, 
where the States attempt to occupy the field but do it inadequately 
-by going through the form of legislation so as to deprive the 
Clayton Act, the Sherman Act, and the other acts of their jurisdic-
tion, it is the Senator's interpretation of the conference report that 
in a case of that kind, where the legislature fails adequately even 
to deal with the field it attempts to cover, these acts still would 
apply? 
Mr. McCarran. That is my interpretation. 42 
Senator Barkley does not appear to have been concerned with the ques-
tion of whether or not the inadequate state legislation was a sham, but 
rather with the inadequacy itself, regardless of the legislature's good 
intentions. Senator Barkley's concern raises the same question posed 
by the plaintiff in Fleming. 
The position taken by the federal district court in Fleming is not 
unique; other courts have also held, in effect, that any legislation which 
is not sham and which covers the area of insurance regulation fulfills 
the requirements of the McCarran Act and renders the federal antitrust 
laws inapplicable. 43 This position is typified by a 1969 decision of a 
federal district court in Mississippi. 
This statute [the McCarran Act] reflected the public policy of re-
•z 91 Cong. Rec. 1443-1444 ( 1945 ). 
43 See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Lanier, 361 F.2d 870 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 930 
( 1966); North Little Rock Transp. Co. v. Casualty Reciprocal Exch., 181 F.2d 174 (8th 
Cir. 1950); California League of Indep. Ins. Producers v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., 175 F. 
Supp. 857 (N.D. Cal. 1959); and National Cas. Co. v. Federal Trade Commn., 245 F.2d 
883 (6th Cir. 1957), aff'd per curiam, 357 U.S. 560 (1958). 
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£raining from interference with regulation of insurance companies 
by the several states ... and of giving broad national support 
to state regulation of the insurance business by throwing the 
weight of Congressional power behind state systems ... It is 
only when a state has not acted that federal legislation becomes 
effective .... A state "regulates" the business of insurance ... 
when it "generally proscribes ... or permits or authorizes certain 
conduct on the part of the insurance companies" .... Whether 
the statutory plan of a state's regulation of insurance "embodies 
the wisest and most effective of regulation" is not for the courts 
to decide. 44 
The result in Fleming was predictable in view of the prior judicial 
practice of looking only for some regulation by the state. However, 
as will be discussed, most of the cases prior to Fleming did not repre-
sent a challenge to a regulatory pattern similar to that in Massachu-
setts. 
Of the decisions relied on by the Fleming court, A Us tate Insurance 
Co. v. Lanier45 represents the only direct challenge to a state regula-
tory system as violative of the federal antitrust laws. However, in that 
case it was the insurance companies themselves who objected to a 
North Carolina statutory provision that required them to join a rating 
organization and abide by the rates it promulgated. The statute also 
required all rates to be approved by the commissioner of insurance,46 
who was an elected official. On such facts, a holding that the North 
Carolina legislation was regulatory within the meaning of the McCar-
ran Act can hardly be said to justify a holding that any state legisla-
tion enacted in good faith is sufficient to comply with the require-
ments of the act. The regulations held sufficient in Allstate were 
considerably more stringent than those upheld in Fleming. 
The Fleming decision contains no reference to North Little Rock 
Transportation Co. v. Casualty Reciprocal Exchange, 47 but the 
latter case provides another example of a state regulatory scheme that 
was upheld by a federal court. In North Little Rock, the plaintiff 
44 Holly Springs Funeral Home, Inc. v. United Funeral Service, Inc., 303 F. Supp. 
128, 135 (N.D. Miss. 1969). This position has not gone uncriticized: "These decisions, 
indicating that state legislation constitutes regulation within the meaning of the section 
2(b) proviso of the McCarran Act, seem erroneous. Such a rationale offers an easy formula 
for the solution of jurisdictional conflicts: If a state statute covers the practice involved, 
the state's jurisdiction is deemed exclusive. From a public policy viewpoint, effective 
administration of such legislation should be a prerequisite to state regulation. Since 
state regulatory machinery lags behind its statutory framework in nearly every state, a 
regulatory vacuum is created, not effectively reached by the states and into which the 
federal government cannot enter. Since the property and casualty insurance industry 
constitutes a substantial segment of the national economy and is imbued with the public 
interest, it should not be allowed to operate outside both state and federal control." Rose, 
State Regulation of Property and Casualty Insurance Rates, 28 Ohio St. L.J. 669, 711 
(1967). 
45 361 F.2d 870 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 930 (1966). 
46 N.C. Gen Stat. §58-248 (enacted 1939). 
47 181 F.2d 174 (8th Cir. 1950). 
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alleged, in effect, that an Arkansas statute authorizing the licensing 
of rating organizations did not constitute regulation under the McCar-
ran Act. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 
correctly held that the McCarran Act permits such organizations so 
long as they are "licensed and supervised" by the state.48 It should be 
noted, however, that Arkansas law provided that the rates filed by a 
rating organization could not become effective, in the absence of 
actual approval by the insurance commissioner, for at least fifteen 
days after filing. 49 Accordingly, in upholding the rating organiza-
tion and the state laws sanctioning it, the court did not have to face 
the issue of whether a state could effectively supervise under a "file 
and use" provision. North Little Rock, like Allstaie, thus does not 
provide much support for the Fleming proposition that good faith 
legislation amounts to adequate regulation of the insurance industry.50 
The Fleming rationale has been reinforced by a decision just ren-
dered in Ohio in an action that challenged that state's "file and 
use" provision.51 The challenge went somewhat beyond that pre-
sented in Fleming, in that the Ohio regulations were alleged not only 
to be ineffective but also to be mere pretenses insofar as the insurance 
superintendent's office did not and could not enforce even the limited 
prerogatives provided in the state's "file and use" provision.52 "The 
essence of the complaint is that there is an absence of state regulation 
48 I d. at 177. 
49 Ark. Acts of 1947, Act 116, §4. 
50 Other decisions cited in Fleming that have held federal antitrust laws inapplicable to 
the insurance industry are even more distinguishable. In California League of lndep. Ins. 
Producers v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., 175 F. Supp. 857, (N.D. Cal. 1959), the plaintiffs 
sought to invoke federal antitrust laws against several insurance companies that had 
allegedly entered into an agreement to lower the commissions paid to agents. Although 
permitting them to cooperate in such matters, California law specifically prohibits the 
companies from entering into agreements. Cal. Ins. Code §1853.6 (enacted 1947). Clearly, 
an express prohibition must fall within the meaning of regulate as used in Section 1012(b) 
of the McCarran Act. Insofar as the plaintiffs were afforded a remedy under the state 
regulations, federal antitrust laws were quite properly held inapplicable. In National 
Cas. Co. v. Federal Trade Commn., 245 F.2d 883 (6th Cir. 1957), aff'd per curiam, 357 
U.S. 560 (1958), the commission claimed that allegedly unfair advertising practices of 
insurance companies were of an interstate nature and hence not susceptible to effective 
regulation by the states. In a per curiam decision, the Supreme Court emphasized that 
the advertising was in fact conducted on a local basis and could thus be controlled under 
state law. Accordingly, federal antitrust law was held not to apply where the states had 
regulated. 
It was in the above two cases that the courts first spoke of regulation as a general pro-
hibition of certain standards of conduct. 175 F. Supp. 857, 860; 357 U.S. 560, 564. It is 
significant, however, that both decisions emphasized the prohibitory nature of the state 
statutes in question, implying that regulation may require the prohibition of certain 
activities by insurance companies and rating organizations, although the prohibited 
activities need not be specifically described. Under such a standard, a state has not 
regulated if the companies can do whatever they please despite the existence of a state 
statute. 
51 OhioAFL-CIO v. Insurance RatingBd., 451 F.2d 1178 (6th Cir. 1971). 
52 Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the staff of the superintendent of insurance 
was inadequate to review information relating to rate changes;· that such rate increases 
had never been challenged by the Ohio Department of Insurance; and that " 'the De-
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[as required by the McCarran Act] and that the state has abdicated its 
function of regulating the automobile insurance industry in favor of 
regulation by the automobile insurance industry itsel£."53 The Sixth 
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's dismissal of the 
complaint, for essentially the same reasons advanced by the district 
court in Fleming, and held that regulation under Section 1012(b) of 
the McCarran Act is satisfied " 'when a State statute generally pro-
scribes ... or permits ... certain conduct.' "54 Mention was 
made by the circuit court that it had not found a satisfactory definition 
of regulation in the legislative history of the act.55 The plaintiffs' 
allegations regarding the state's failure to enforce the regulations were 
summarily dismissed on the ground that "there is nothing in the 
language of the McCarran Act or in its legislative history to support 
the thesis that the Act does not apply when the state's scheme of regu-
lation has not been effectively enforced."56 What the court seems to 
have overlooked is its own assessment of the plaintiff's complaint, 
namely, that Ohio's regulatory scheme resulted in no regulation what-
soever. 
Besides finding that nothing in the McCarran Act precluded "file 
and use" regulations, the court in Fleming offered a second rationale 
for its decision, based upon a line of decisions beginning with Parker 
v. Brown. 57 In that case the United States Supreme Court held that 
a state may authorize or create a combination that would ordinarily 
violate the federal antitrust laws, so long as the authorization is made 
in an attempt to further a legitimate state interest. Parker involved a 
complex legislative program for regulating the marketing of produce 
in California so as to "conserve the agricultural wealth of the State," 
to maintain prices, and to "prevent economic waste in the marketing 
of agricultural products of the state.''58 The program provided for 
the creation of a board of produce growers that would establish various 
marketing policies and make decisions as to which crops might be sold 
and at what price the crops would be offered. Detailed in the program 
were the manner in which the board was to be constituted and the 
procedure by which it was to reach the relevant decisions. Moreover, 
a state commission was charged with enforcement of the policy pro-
nouncements issued by the growers. The Supreme Court rejected a 
claim that the program stood in violation of the Sherman Act: 
The Sherman Act makes no mention of the state as such, and 
gives no hint that it was intended to restrain state action or 
partment does not even employ or have on its staff an actuary so as to be able to examine 
the rate filing.'" Id. at 1180. 
53 Id. at 1180. 
54 Id. at 1181, citing California League of Indep. Ins. Producers v. Aetna Cas. and 
Sur. Co., 175 F. Supp. 857,860 (N.D. Cal. 1959). 
55 451 F.2d 1178, 1181-1182 (6th Cir. 1971 ). 
56 I d. at 1184. But see the legislative history discussed earlier in this comment. 
57 317U.S.341 (1943). 
58 I d. at 346. 
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official action directed by a state. . . . 
There is no suggestion of a purpose to restrain state action in 
the Act's legislative history. The sponsor of the bill which was 
ultimately enacted as the Sherman Act declared that it pre-
vented only "business combinations". . . . That its purpose 
was to suppress combinations to restrain competition and 
attempts to monopolize by individuals and corporations, 
abundantly appears from its legislative history.59 
Parker thus established the inapplicability of the antitrust laws to 
state action. 
Decisions following Parker have been marked by a consistent ex-
tending of judicial sympathy for state-authorized combinations. A 
particularly interesting decision, cited in Fleming, is Miley v. john 
Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co.,6o where several Massachusetts 
insurance companies allegedly conspired with the State Employees' 
Group Commission (also named as a defendant) to win a contract 
for group insurance of state employees. The lowest bid on the con-
tract had been submitted by a Minnesota firm, whereas the rates bid 
by the Massachusetts companies corresponded to those they had 
filed on a different contract bid with the New York insurance com-
missioner. Because the Massachusetts companies could not lower 
their bids without seriously jeopardizing their chances of doing 
business in New York, the companies arranged with the State Em-
ployees' Group Commission to have a bid matching that of the 
Minnesota firm submitted by a small Massachusetts company that 
did no New York business. This small firm was awarded the con-
tract and promptly resold 95 percent of it to the larger Massachu-
setts companies. The ensuing antitrust action brought by a prospec-
tive broker of the Minnesota firm was dismissed as an improper 
inquiry into state action in a legitimate state sphere, namely, the 
regulation of insurance. 
In matters of insurance, the regulatory initiative has been left to 
the states under the McCarran Act; Parker simply 'prevents the 
federal antitrust laws from restricting the chosen method of state 
regulation. Consequently, it should be noted that the issue in Miley 
is somewhat different from that in Fleming. In Miley, as in Parker, 
the court was concerned with the question of whether the challenged 
state action was proper in view of the federal antitrust laws.61 In 
Fleming, however, plaintiff's contention was that there had been 
no state action because the "file and use" provision permitted insur-
59 I d. at 351. 
60 148 F. Supp. 299 (D. Mass.), aff'd per curiam, 242 F.2d 758 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 
355 u.s. 828(1957). 
61 See E. W. Wiggins Airways, Inc. v. Massachusetts Port Authority, 362 F.2d 52 (lst 
Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 947 (1966); and Washington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Elec. 
Power Co., 438 F.2d 248 (4th Cir. 1971). In the latter case the court declared, "The teach-
ing of Parker v. Brown is that the antitrust laws are directed against individual and not 
state action. When a state has a public policy against free competition in an industry im-
portant to it, the state may regulate that industry in order to control, or in a proper case, 
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ance companies to operate without any state regulation. 
Parker, however, is susceptible of a narrower reading than many 
courts have given it. The decision contained the caveat that "a state 
does not give immunity to those who violate the Sherman Act by 
authorizing them to violate it, or by declaring that their action is 
lawful. ... "62 This caveat seems to imply that before activities 
may be sheltered under the Parker doctrine, they must be established 
as state activities. Private combinations, even though authorized by 
the state, are not protected from the federal antitrust laws.63 Whether 
or not conspiratorial activities are public or private is thus a thres-
hold question since the Parker doctrine cannot be applied unless 
those activities are characterized as public. Presumably, a combina-
tion is public if it is actively controlled by the state; only then does it 
become "state action." In short, application of the Parker doctrine 
requires raising the same issue as was raised in interpreting Section 
1012(b) of the McCarran Act: Has the state truly regulated the 
various business combinations in the insurance industry? 
The difficulties in defining regulate are apparent from the num-
ber of decisions in which an attempt at definition has been made.64 
Given this abundance of decisions, it is somewhat surprising that 
no Massachusetts court has addressed itself directly to the problem. 
Consider, however, the following examples from other jurisdictions: 
"Regulate" means to govern or direct according to rule, to 
bring under the control of constituted authority.65 
Every element of this definition involves restraint, the exercise 
of a power over a thing by which its activities are ruled or ad-
justed, or directed to certain ends.66 
These definitions seem to cast the regulator in a much more active 
to eliminate competition therein. It may even permit persons subject to such control to 
participate in the regulation, provided their activities are adequately supervised by in-
dependent state officials." Id. at 251, citing Asheville Tobacco Bd. of Trade, Inc. v. 
Federal Trade Commn., 263 F.2d 502, 509 (4th Cir. 1959). 
62 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943). See also Washington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Elec. 
Power Co., 438 F.2d 248 (4th Cir. 1971). 
63 In Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951), the Supreme 
Court considered a Louisiana statute which authorized wholesale and retail liquor dis-
tributors to enter into contracts providing that the "buyer will not resell 'except at the 
price stipulated by the vendor.' " Id. at 386. Furthermore, the law provided that once any 
retailer entered into such a contract, all other retailers with knowledge of the contract 
were prohibited from underselling him; they became bound by his agreement. Id. at 387. 
The Court found that the state was simply permitting members of the liquor industry 
to fix prices at their discretion. Citing the Parker case, the Court held that "when a state 
compels retailers to follow a parallel price policy, it demands private conduct which the 
Sherman Act forbids." Id. at 389. 
64 76C.J.S. 610-616 (1952). 
65 Farmington River Co. v. Town Plan and Zoning Commn., 25 Conn. Supp. 125, 
137, 197 A.2d 653, 660 (Super. Ct. 1963). See also Salt Lake City v. Revene, 101 Utah 504, 
508, 124 P.2d 537, 539 (1942). 
66 State v. Bass, 177 Tenn. 609, 615, 152 S.W.2d, 236, 238 (1941), citing Nashville v. 
Linck, 80 Tenn. 499, 512 (1883). 
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role than does Chapter 175A of the Massachusetts General Laws. To 
govern, direct, or restrain implies the right to function as a protag-
onist, not merely the option to respond to various situations. It 
may be permissible to equate state regulation with state action, but 
action should be distinguished from reaction. The mere option to 
disapprove does not seem to correspond with the right to regulate, 
any more than the right to veto corresponds with the right to legis-
late. 
Chapter 175A of the Massachusetts General Laws places the 
commissioner of insurance in a position of merely reacting on mat-
ters of rate review. Because the statute makes rate review optional, there 
is no assurance that the commissioner will exercise even the limited 
power he has been given. The following excerpts are from an opin-
ion that the Massachusetts attorney general· issued shortly after 
Chapter 175A was enacted: 
The words used by the Legislature in this connection-"1£ 
at any time the commissioner finds that a filing does not meet 
the requirements of this chapter, he shall, after a hearing . . . 
issue an order ... " do not indicate a legislative intent to re-
quire of the commissioner the duty to review every filing im-
mediately upon its receipt or to review it upon his own motion 
at any particular time, or indeed to review it at all unless he has 
reason to believe that it does not meet the statutory require-
ments .... 
6. Your sixth question reads: 
"May the Commissioner permit a filing to be effective without 
review unless and until a complaint is made with him in the 
manner outlined in section 7(b) by any person aggrieved?" ... 
I am confirmed in my opinion with relation to your last five 
questions by the fact that the Legislature, prior to the passage 
of the statutes in question, rejected proposed amendments to 
them which required examinations of filings by the Commis-
sioner within a specific period or as soon as reasonably pos-
sible after filing. In the form in which said section 7 was finally 
enacted by the General Court, it would appear to have been the 
legislative intent t.o leave the matter of review of filings to the 
sound discretion and judgment of the Commissioner. ... 67 
Even when the commissioner chooses to review a p<J.rticular rate 
filing, it seems clear that his disapproval will not be retroactive to 
the date of filing. Although the Supreme Judicial Court has not 
ruled on the retroactivity question,68 the wording of Chapter 175A 
leaves little room for doubt: 
If at any time the commissioner finds that a filing does not 
67 Op.Atty. Gen. 38, 39-40(Dec. 15, 1947). 
68 The Supreme Judicial Court determined that resolution of the retroactivity ques-
tion was not necessary to its decision in Insurance Rating Bd. v. Commissioner of Ins., 
1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1285, 260 N.E.2d 922. 
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meet the requirements of this chapter, he shall, after a hearing 
held upon not less than ten days' written notice, ... issue an 
order specifying in what respects he finds that such filing fails 
to meet the requirements of this chapter, and stating when, 
within a reasonable period thereafter, such filing shall be 
deemed no longer effective. 69 [Emphasis added.] 
The notice requirement means that a minimum period of ten days 
will pass before the commissioner has effective jurisdiction over the 
rates. It is questionable whether there is any regulation-by even 
the most relaxed standards-during this grace period of at least 
ten days. It could also be argued that the lack of authority in the 
commissioner to disapprove retroactively is not consonant with the 
Supreme Court's pronouncement that "a state does not give immu-
nity to those who violate the Sherman Act by authorizing them to 
violate it. ... " 70 Massachusetts has, in effect, granted the insur-
ance companies immunity to act in combination and to fix rates 
without any state interference for at least ten days-and possibly 
much longer. 
Before enacting Chapter l75A, the Massachusetts legislature 
considered one other major alternative, the so-called All-Industry 
Bill,71 drafted by a national committee representing various seg-
ments of the insurance industry. This bill provided for more strin-
gent regulation of insurance companies. Some of the major features 
of the model bill have been described as follows: 
After the rate is filed with the insurance commissioner, the all-
industry bills provide (a) that no premium schedule shall be 
effective until fifteen days after its filing; (b) that the commis-
sioner may extend this period of suspense for another fifteen 
days; (c) that the commissioner may, before the period of sus-
pense expires, disapprove any rate schedule if it is excessive, 
inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory, in which case it shall 
be ineffective; (d) that the commissioner may, after a schedule 
has become effective and either in a response to a complaint or 
on his own motion, hold a hearing concerning the propriety of 
such schedule, and may, after such hearing, disapprove the 
schedule, either in whole or in part, so far as future transactions 
are concerned. If the commissioner fails to disapprove a filing 
within the waiting period or the extension, then the filing is 
deemed to meet the requirements of the act. This provision is 
the so-called deemer clause: rates are deemed approved unless 
affirmatively disapproved by the commissioner.72 
•• G.L., c. 175A, §7 A. 
70 Parkerv. Brown, 317 U.S. 341,351 (1943). 
71 Mass. House Bi111090(1947). 
72 Rose, State Regulation of Property and Casualty Insurance Rates, 28 Ohio St. 
L.J. 699, 701 (1967). The cited provisions are virtually identical to those proposed in 
Mass. House Bill 1090 §§4, 5 (1947). 
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The committee on insurance rejected the All-Industry Bill: 
That bill imposes upon the Commissioner the wholly impractic-
able duty of reviewing and approving thousands upon thousands 
of rates within a brief period of time. The detailed and particular-
ized policing of rates involved in a law of this character would 
saddle the Commissioner with an impossible administrative task, 
substantially increase the expense to this Commonwealth of oper-
ating the Insurance Department, and would substitute the Commis-
sioner's judgment for that of experienced insurance underwriters. 73 
The committee majority also claimed that the All-Industry Bill was 
not truly representative of the insurance industry,74 and the objections 
raised by dissident factions in the industry are contained. throughout 
the majority report. Moreover, the majority argued that the tighter 
regulations in the All-Industry Bill would make rate deviation so diffi-
cult as to stifle competition and encourage monopoly. The majority 
concluded that state regulation of insurance was indeed in the public 
interest, but that the "federal requirements as set forth in [the McCarran 
Act] can adequately be met with a minimum of regulation by adoption 
of [proposed Chapter 175A]."75 
It is suggested that the majority's reasoning in rejecting the stricter 
All-Industry Bill and opting for the present law does not correspond to 
the spirit with which Congress expected the states to enact regulatory 
legislation. Where Congress had asked for regulation, the majority 
sought only to "occupy the field;"76 where Congress and the president 
had emphasized the need for "effective and affirmative" enactments, the 
majority spoke in terms of a "minimum of regulation." Indeed, the 
committee's minority report77 represents a far better approximation 
of the congressional purpose. That report analyzed the obligations 
placed upon the states by the McCarran Act in a much more positive 
manner: "To meet federal requirements rates must be adequately and 
affirmatively regulated. Anything less than the regulation required by 
the Commissioner's All-Industry bills will not meet that test."78 More-
over, the minority was most vigorous in its denunciation of the mea-
sure that was to become Chapter 175A. What is particularly interesting 
is that the objections raised closely parallel those asserted by the plain-
tiff in Fleming. The minority considered the bill recommended by the 
majority a "palpable sham" because: 
(a) All filings become effective immediately, and therefore the 
73 Report of the Committee on Insurance Sitting as a Special Recess Committee to 
Study State Regulation of the Insurance Industry, Mass~ Senate Bill 610 at 18-19 (1947). 
74 Id. at 15. This argument was vigorously disputed in the minority report, which 
included excerpts from the address of an insurance representative to the General Court. 
He claimed that the insurance companies could not possibly be so naive as to adopt 
restrictions they did not think necessary. Id. at 30. 
75 ld. at24. 
76 ld. at 14. 
77 ld. at25. 
78 Id. at27. 
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Commissioner cannot-
( 1) Prevent the use of illegal rates. 
(2) Require refunds if excessive rates have been charged the 
public. 
(3) Require the company to collect additional premiums if in-
adequate rates have been charged. 
( 4) Correct or prevent unfair discrimination even between policy-
holders of the same company. 
(5) Prevent "flash" filings. 
(6) Protect adequately the public against excessive rates. 
(b) Rates made by concert of action, namely bureau rates (pro-
hibited under the Sherman Act unless regulated by the states under 
the provisions of [the McCarran Act]) could be used indefinitely. 
(c) There is absolutely no provision whatever in the majority's 
bills requiring the Insurance Commissioner to review rates before 
they are charged to the public.79 
The minority's criticisms point out that under Chapter 175A insur-
ance companies may theoretically operate indefinitely without any 
state regulation. For example, a completely arbitrary and unsupported 
rate may be filed and used for at least ten days.80 Just prior to the effec-
tive date of the commissioner's disapproval, similar rates may be filed, 
and again, for another ten days or more, the commissioner cannot pre-
vent their use. This procedure obviously could be repeated. On the 
other hand, it has been suggested that the expense of compiling a rate 
system operates to deter the insurance companies from filing rates that 
the companies know the commissioner will not accept. Thus it is argued 
that in practice a "file and. use" provision offers as much protection as 
a requirement for prior approval of rates by the commissioner.81 It 
should be noted, however, that a rate filing need not be accompanied 
by any supporting data,82 thereby inviting a simple percentage in-
crease that could be compiled with relatively little expense. In practice, 
the most effective deterrent to "flash filings" may well be the fear that 
flagrant abuses will cause the legislature to enact more effective regula-
tions. 
If it is found that the Massachusetts "file and use" provision does not 
regulate within the meaning of the McCarran Act, the courts should 
have little difficulty in indicating the standards for sufficient regula-
tion. Presumably, such regulation would provide the commissioner 
with jurisdiction over rates at all times and thus eliminate the jurisdic-
tional lapse between the time of filing and the time the order of dis-
approval becomes effective. Regulations such as those contained in the 
All-Industry Bill, which a majority of states have enacted,83 would be 
79 I d. at 27-28. 
80 In Minnesota, a disapproval cannot become effective before 30 days. Minn. Stat. 
Ann. §70A.ll(l) (1969). 
81 Note, The Regulation oflnsurance Rates, 47 Colum. L. Rev.l314,1329(1947). 
82 Insurance Rating Bd. v. Commissioner of Ins., 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1285, 260 
N.E.2d 922. 
83 Waiting-period provisions are currently in force in 25 states. [The years here given 
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sufficient insofar as failure of the commissioner to act within the wait-
ing period creates a presumption of approval. In other words, under 
the all-industry regulations it is theoretically impossible for rates to go 
into effect against the wishes of the commissioner.84 
If a "file and use" provision were held insufficient under the McCar-
ran Act, any retroactive application of the federal antitrust laws would 
clearly subject the insurance industry to prohibitive damages. Although 
most examples of prospective application of a decision are in the field 
of criminallaw,85 the United States Supreme Court has indicated that 
prospective operation may be justified in civil cases as well. In Link-
letter v. Walker,- which contains a thorough analysis of the issue, the 
Court declared that "the accepted rule today is that in appropriate 
cases the Court may in the interest of justice make the rule prospec-
tive."86 If the Massachusetts "file and use" provision were declared 
are those of enactment.] Alaska Stat. §21.39.040(d) (1966); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §20-3458 
(1954); Ark. Stat. Ann. §66-3110(2) (1959); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §72-11·5(2) (1947); Fla. 
Stat. Ann. §627.101 (1959); Hawaii Rev. Stat. §431-694(e) (1955); Iowa Code Ann. §515A.4 
(1965); Kan. Stat. Ann. §40-928(d) (1947); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §304.13-050(2) (1970); La. 
Rev. Stat. §22:1407D (1964); Md. Ann. Code art. 48A, §242(d)(7) (1951); Mich. Stat. Ann. 
§24.12408(2) (1948); Neb. Rev. Stat. §44-1408 (1947); Nev. Rev. Stat. §694.100 (1947); 
N.M. Stat. Ann. §58-10-S(d) (1971); N.Y. Ins. Law §184 (McKinney 1948); N.D. Cent. 
Code §26·28-04 (1947); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 36 §902G (1953); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 40, §1184 
(d) (1947); R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. §27-9·10 (1948); S.C. Code Ann. §37-694 (1947); S.D. 
Code §31.3804(4) (1947); Utah Code Ann. §31-18-3(2) (1947); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. 
§48.19.440 (1947); W. Va. Code Ann. §33-20-4(e) (1957). New Hampshire's statute has a 
"file and use" provision, but the statute also gives the commissioner discretionary power 
to suspend rates for up to 30 days pending his review of them. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§414:5(a) (1947). 
84 Obviously, regulations requiring prior approval of rates would be sufficient. Such 
provisions are now in force in two states. [The years here given are those of enactment.] 
N.C. Gen. Stat. §58-248 (1939); Va. Code Ann. §38.1-253 (1952). Missouri requires prior 
approval of all rates made in concert or through rating organizations. Mo. Ann. Stat. 
§379.465 (1947). 
Three states have "free competition" regulations. Cal. Ins. Code §1853.6 (1947); Ga. 
Code Ann. §56-510 (1967); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. §40-3643 (1969). These regulations 
do not require any filings at all, but they prohibit insurance companies from adhering 
to rating agreements. See n.50 supra. Arguably, this type of regulation prevents anti-
trust abuses, but in so doing it may sacrifice many benefits which might be derived from 
the use of rating organizations. 
Besides Massachusetts, 15 states have "file and use" or similar provisions. Ala. Code 
tit. 28, §394 (1945); Del. Code Ann. tit. 18, §2506 (1970); Ind. Ann. Stat. §39-5242(d) (1967); 
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 24-A, §2306 (1969); Minn. Stat. Ann. §70A.06(1) (1969); Miss. 
Code Ann. §5834-03(c) (1946); N.J. Stat. Ann. §17:29A-6, 7 (1944); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 
§3937.03(c) (Baldwin 1964); Ore. Rev. Stat. §737.205(1) (1969); Tenn. Code Ann. §56· 
603(c) (1945); Texas Ins. Code art. 5.15(d) (1945); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 8, §4655 (1947); Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. §26.1-272 (1947). In Connecticut and Wisconsin, rates may actually be effec-
tive for a "reasonable time" prior to filing. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §38-20l(n) (1969); Wis. 
Stat. Ann. §625.13 (1969). 
At this writing, Illinois, which has used the all-industry system and then "free compe-
tition," has no casualty insurance regulations. The "free competition" statute, Ill. Ann. 
Stat. c. 73, §1065.18-1 (1969), expired August I, 1971, and new regulations have yet to be 
enacted. 
85 See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967); Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 
(1966); Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S. 406 (1966); James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961). 
86 381 u.s. 618,628 (1965). 
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insufficient under the McCarran Act, the courts would have no difficul-
ty in finding it appropriate to apply the ruling prospectively. Retro-
spective application would result in severe economic consequences 
under the Sherman Act and would be unfair because of the extent to 
which the former standards had been relied upon. 
Conclusion. It has been the purpose of this comment to demonstrate 
that the legislative history of the McCarran Act does not support a 
ruling that mere legislation, enacted in good faith and without sham 
or pretense, is sufficient regulation under the act. The legislative his-
tory and the types of "state action" customarily left immune from 
federal antitrust laws suggest that states must regulate effectively in 
order to comply with the McCarran Act. Accordingly, a claim that 
state insurance regulations are so ineffective as not to be regulatory 
should constitute a legitimate cause of action. 
An examination of the Massachusetts regulatory scheme, particularly 
the "file and use" provision, reveals that the state has failed to take 
complete, that is, effective, jurisdiction over the insurance industry 
because of the commissioner's inability to control rates in the period 
between the date of filing and the effective date of any subsequent dis-
approval. The Massachusetts system was enacted out of policy consid-
erations which did not properly conform to those that motivated the 
supporters of the McCarran Act. It is submitted, therefore, that legis-
lative or judicial action should be taken to give effect to the congres-
purpose underlying the McCarran Act. 
STEVEN L. PAUL 
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